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CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS = BROKEN WINDOWS: 
DE MINIMIS CURET LEX 
Anita Bernstein* 
Abstract 
Civil rights violations that appear relatively slight may warrant judicial 
redress despite their small size; some of them point up important principles. 
Leaving these violations unremedied may contribute to an ambient 
lawlessness that can foster bigger harms. A small infringement in this respect 
resembles the criminological construct of “broken windows,” which in its 
prescriptive form urges governments to view de minimis violations as 
harbingers of more disorder to come.  
Using broken windows to understand privately initiated civil rights claims 
honors a statutory mandate and helps to achieve progressive ends. This 
application is potentially better than the one that police impose on the street, 
which has raised concerns about both justice and efficacy. Rendered as a 
maxim, the precept that this Article commends is De minimis curet lex: The 
law ought to concern itself with some affronts that appear small. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Maxims of equity, formed in England at the Court of Chancery, perch 
quaintly today on American jurisprudence.1 Within contemporary decisional 
law and legal scholarship, they are historical curiosities.2 Adages like the 
hortatory “Whomever seeks equity must do equity,”3 the descriptive “Equity 
regards as done that which ought to be done,”4 the dog-Latin “Qui peccat 
ebrius luat sobrius,”5 and the Norman demi-French “Non dat qui non habet”6 
sound like attempts to be funny, rather than doctrines.7 
De minimis non curat lex―“the law does not concern itself with 
trifles”―is exceptional among the equity maxims. The ancient phrase still 
shows up frequently, not only in modern decisional law but also in state 
statutes and federal regulations.8 Judges regard de minimis non curat lex as 
limiting their own prerogative: Once they conclude that an asserted interest is 
trivial, they withhold what the asserters seek. This predilection can relocate 
what parties fight for in court. Litigants lose when their stance is cast as trivial 
or when they fail to persuade the judge that their adversary has made a trivial 
claim. They win when they escape the “trivial” label that their adversary has 
tried to impose or when they persuade the judge that it is their adversary, not 
they, who is making a trivial claim. 
Concerns with triviality fill many domains of American law, both public 
and private. The case law occupying this Article studies a portion of the issue. 
I review decisional law involving plaintiffs who alleged that defendants 
violated federal antidiscrimination provisions and judges who granted 
summary disposition against, or reversed a jury verdict for, these plaintiffs by 
concluding that the infractions were too small or unimportant to warrant 
redress. This Article uses “small” and “trivial” capaciously to include any 
reductive judicial view of the wrongful conduct that the complainant 
experienced: no big deal, not material, an isolated episode or instance, merely 
mediate or interlocutory rather than ultimate, or not greeted with sufficiently 
vehement contemporaneous protest. 
 
                                                                                                                          
 1. Jeff Nemerofsky, What Is a “Trifle” Anyway?, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 315, 322 (2001–02) (noting 
the quaintness of these maxims). For the same point in a more jocular vein, see James Grimmelmann, 
Koans of Equity, 58 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472 (2008). 
 2. J. Stanley McQuade, Ancient Legal Maxims and Modern Human Rights, 18 CAMPBELL L. 
REV. 75, 75 (1996). 
 3. Linda A. Taylor & David M. Wood, Equitable Jurisdiction of the Provincial Court of 
Alberta (Civil Division), 35 ALBERTA L. REV. 592, 619 (1997). 
 4. Id. 
 5. “Sin drunk, pay sober.” McQuade, supra note 2, at 108 n.61. 
 6. “You can’t give what you haven’t got.” Id. at 108 n.62. 
 7. Years ago, I spent a summer at a law firm in Delaware, the American state famed for its own 
chancery court. Summer associates and younger lawyers billing time in the firm’s library would 
sometimes call out facetious chancery maxims of` their own composition. “Equity will not wear brown 
shoes with a blue suit” is one of the more printable coinages I recall. See also Grimmelmann, supra note 
1 (recounting equity maxims as punch lines).  
 8. Nemerofsky, supra note 1, at 328–30. 
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“Small” and “trivial” are of course gradable adjectives whose meanings 
can emerge only in a context.9 How much is much?10 As it turns out, 
“isolated,” as judges use the word to modify “incidents” or “episodes,” also 
lacks an absolute definition. It does not mean solitary or unitary but instead 
too few, or too wan, to impress the decisionmaker-author.11 De minimis has 
the same gradable, context-dependent function.  
De minimis in practice also shows that small things grow big in the right 
contextual soil.12 For centuries, judges have taken certain “trifles” seriously 
indeed. Slight violations of rights in property―especially real property―have 
gained a respectful hearing in common law courts. The tort of trespass to land 
retains its medieval dispensation from a general rule that a plaintiff must 
suffer injury to receive damages.13 Whenever anyone enters land “against the 
will of the possessor,” wrote one American court in the early 19th century, 
“the law infers some damage; if nothing more, the treading down the grass or 
the herbage . . . .”14 One influential contemporary decision has led federal 
courts to reject de minimis for claims of copyright infringement: any 
unauthorized use, no matter how small, will entitle the copyright holder to 
make a claim for redress.15 Litigants alleging violation of their constitutional 
rights enjoy shelter from de minimis as well.16 
From the accepted starting point that many property-rights and 
constitutional-rights claims should not be dismissed or rejected merely 
because of the small size of violations, I argue in this Article that the law 
should extend this exclusion, and regard civil rights claims as less entitled to 
the de minimis haven that now offers considerable immunity to wrongdoers.  
Here “civil rights” means what a noted lexicographer has called “[t]hose rights 
guaranteed to an individual as a member of society,” or “positive legal 
prerogatives―the right to equal treatment before the law, the right to vote, the 
right to share equally with other citizens in such benefits as jobs, housing, 
                                                                                                                          
 9. James J. Kilpatrick, Quite an Interesting Question, BUFFALO NEWS, Aug. 29, 1999, at 5H 
(explaining that gradable adjectives are those that “the adverbs more, less or very can modify”).  
 10. This question languishes unresolved on WikiAnswers. See http://wiki.answers.com/Q/How_  
much_is_much (reporting no replies). 
 11. See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445, 499 
(1997). 
 12. See Christopher Caldwell, Some Trifles Do Concern the Law, FIN. TIMES, July 24, 2009, 
available at www.ft.com (free registration required–search “caldwell and trifles” in principal search 
query box for “News”) (describing the German doctrine of Bagatelldiebstahl, or extremely petty theft, 
for which an employee may be dismissed notwithstanding the strong federal laws protecting employees’ 
rights). 
 13. The maxim on point here is the non-equity refusal to recognize damnum absque injuria. See 
Alabama Power v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1937) (quoting the maxim). 
 14. Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371, 371 (1835). For a defense of this view in the context of 
modern land torts, see Richard A. Epstein, How to Create―or Destroy―Wealth in Real Property, 58 
ALA. L. REV. 741, 750–51 (2007). 
 15. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005). For a study of the 
importance of this decision in copyright law, see generally Andrew Inesi, A Theory of De Minimis and a 
Proposal for Its Application in Copyright, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 945 (2006). 
 16. See generally Nemerofsky, supra note 1, at 331–33 (citations omitted). 
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education, and public accommodations.”17 My illustrations of civil rights 
violations come from decisional law that construes federal antidiscrimination 
statutes.  
Because violations of fundamental rights should stand beyond the 
dismissive scorn of a cliché-maxim, I contend, judges who dismiss civil rights 
claims should bring more than de minimis to the rationale that  supports their 
rejections. Civil rights violations go unremedied all the time without the need 
to invoke de minimis. An individual victim with a valid claim might choose 
not to become a plaintiff. This person might not feel wronged, or might feel 
wronged but choose to refrain from protesting, or might lack the legal advice 
that brings deserving claimants to court, or might not want a legal remedy 
after having protested.18 Judges, for their part, might have good reasons 
beyond de minimis for denying redress to an aggrieved plaintiff.19 But 
wrongdoing protested in court that violates a person’s statutorily protected 
civil rights should not be regarded as a trifle. 
“In this area, we deal with degrees,” wrote one federal appellate court 
when it dismissed a Title VII action that alleged a racially hostile 
environment. “We find no steady barrage of opprobrious racial comment.”20 
Courts do indeed deal with degrees. But no civil rights statute says anything 
about a “steady barrage” of anything as necessary to a prima facie case. The 
idea that civil rights liability ought to repose, fire extinguisher-style, behind 
glass to be broken open only in a dire emergency―in response to only the 
worst offenses―has no basis in any antidiscrimination legislation. Civil rights 
law proscribes discrimination, full stop.21 When courts refuse to hear claims 
because they regard what happened as too small, they stray from both their 
statutory mandate and the chance to ameliorate a social ill. 
This Article expands a metaphor from criminology to describe the 
potential importance of civil rights violations that appear petty. “Broken 
windows” refers to the hypothesis that “low-level offenses like vandalism and 
panhandling create an environment that breeds bigger crimes.”22 The 
metaphor-as-policy has enjoyed extraordinary popularity since its first airing 
                                                                                                                          
 17. WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 127 (5th ed. 2008). 
 18. See William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . , 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636 (1980–
81) (observing that only a small minority of grievances reach the courts). 
 19. See infra Part III.B (giving examples). 
 20. Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1251 (8th Cir. 1981).  
 21. This generalization remains accurate even for a Title VII claim by an employee for hostile-
environment harassment, where the employee-plaintiff must show that the conduct was “sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment,” a judicial demand not found in the statute. 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). Lower courts have misunderstood and misapplied 
the severe-or-pervasive criterion, to the detriment of plaintiffs. Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith B. Tracy, 
Hidden in Plain Sight: Achieving More Just Results in Hostile Work Environments by Re-Examining 
Supreme Court Precedent, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 247, 256–60 (2008). See also infra Part 
III.A.2.  
 22. Karen Kaplan, Wherefore, Litterbug? Bolstering ‘Broken Windows’ Theory, a Study Finds 
People Take Cues of Lawlessness for Surroundings, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2008, at A16 (describing a 
study published in Science). 
900 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
in a 1982 magazine article.23 As effected about a decade later by then-New 
York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and his police commissioner, William Bratton, 
broken windows law enforcement is still routinely credited for a plunge in the 
crime rate of a major city. In response to this acclaim, several critics have 
attacked broken windows law enforcement policy as both futile and 
pernicious.24  
Taking both the thesis and its critics’ antithesis as offering value to 
policymakers, I argue that broken windows enforcement holds value whether 
or not it enhances street policing. Civil rights liability offers an ideal proving 
ground for the metaphor.25 Petty-looking civil rights violations, I argue, 
warrant recognition when this recognition would stop smaller pernicious 
behaviors from encouraging worse wrongs. Although arresting low-level 
offenders and applying the force of law enforcement against manifest 
“disorder” raises numerous worries, citizens who make claims without 
backing by the force of the state expand the potential of this device to achieve 
repair. Their status as private actors keeps the dangers of broken windows law 
enforcement to a minimum. A civil rights application lessens the familiar 
dangers of broken windows as police use the technique: authoritarianism, 
racism, discrimination against the poor, and threats to free expression.  
                                                                                                                          
 23. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29 [hereinafter Atlantic Monthly]. Broken Windows is the 
most frequently reproduced article in the magazine’s long history. William H. Sousa & George L. 
Kelling, Of “Broken Windows,” Criminology, and Criminal Justice in POLICE INNOVATION: 
CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES 77, 77 (David Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006). 
 24. Among legal scholars, Bernard Harcourt has led this critique. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, 
ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING (2001); Bernard E. Harcourt, 
Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken 
Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291 (1998) 
[hereinafter Harcourt, Reflecting]. In recognition of Harcourt’s thoroughness on the subject, I use his 
writings in this Article to stand in for broken-windows disapproval. For other scholarly criticism of the 
hypothesis, see Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation of Public 
Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 603, 637 (1999); 
David Thacher, Order Maintenance Reconsidered: Moving Beyond Strong Causal Reasoning, 94 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381 (2004).  
 25. Although in hindsight Broken Windows reads as advice to municipal governments on how to 
deploy their police, its real-life effect on policing was fortuitous. William Bratton, working in 1982 as 
chief of transit police in Boston, was slightly acquainted with George Kelling when he read Wilson and 
Kelling in the locally published Atlantic Monthly. The article strengthened Bratton’s belief that “a 
patrolman’s primary responsibility was to keep order in a community rather than just respond to 
growing crimes after the fact.” Daniel Brook, The Cracks in ‘Broken Windows,’ BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
19, 2006, at E1. Bratton promptly redoubled his order-maintenance efforts, intensified his friendship 
with Kelling, and later caught the attention of Giuliani. This show of force from an article makes it 
plausible for me to hope that federal judges, whose inclination to side against plaintiffs in civil rights 
cases has been well chronicled―see, e.g., Ann F. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured 
Trilogy: The Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203 
(1993); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dangers of Summary Judgment: Gender and Federal Civil 
Litigation, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 705 (2007); Suja A. Thomas, The Fallacy of Dispositive Procedure, 50 
B.C. L. REV. 759, 760 (2009)―might find this approach to a different area of law enforcement useful or 
congenial.  
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The title of this Article states my thesis: Civil rights violations that appear 
trivial are comparable to the broken windows that inflict little harm directly. 
Both may be deemed destructive, and thus, intolerable; just as a broken 
window might deserve the attention of law enforcement efforts, civil rights 
violations of comparably small size might warrant repair in the courts. 
Modified by conjugation, the Chancery maxim becomes De minimis curet lex: 
For the purpose of remedying and deterring this category of injustice, the law 
should concern itself with small things.26 Plaintiffs seeking to present a civil 
rights claim to a jury should not be turned away with the rationale that their 
allegations are too petty to deserve the court’s time.27 De minimis curet lex 
becomes a constructive alternative maxim, at hand for judges who seek to do 
the right thing.  
The Article starts with description and moves to argument. Part I uses a 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis study to examine the broken windows construct. 
This exposition continues in Part II, which considers unlawful discrimination 
as broken windows, and then gives reasons that privately initiated civil rights 
actions present a better venue for broken windows law enforcement than the 
more familiar street police setting. Anticipating an objection that what I 
propose in this Article could clutter the courts with insignificant or 
undeserving complaints, Part III, the most doctrinal of my three Parts, 
explores alternative routes to summary disposition of a bad claim. I offer these 
applications of doctrine not only to say how courts should answer certain 
recurring questions that arise in civil rights disputes but also to enlarge the 
jurisprudence of broken windows. The recommendations of Part III would 
both enhance judicial constructions of the federal civil rights statutes, all of 
which were codified with no de minimis safe harbor for wrongdoing,28 and put 
the famed broken windows insight to good use.  
 
                                                                                                                          
 26. Curet replaces the simple present of non curat with the hortatory subjunctive form of curare.  
 27. By focusing on federal civil rights law, this Article argues implicitly for reversal of the 
current plunge in civil jury trials in the federal courts. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of 
Trials and the Thirty Years War, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2005) (observing that the number of 
civil trials in U.S. federal courts fell from 12,570 in 1985 to 4,206 in 2003). Writings by federal judges 
that lament the vanishing trial suggest that my thesis will be welcomed in at least some courts. See, e.g., 
Patrick E. Higginbotham, So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 SMU L. REV. 1405, 1423 (2002) 
(“We need trials, and a steady stream of them, to ground our normative standards―to make them 
sufficiently clear that persons can abide by them in planning their affairs . . . .”); Sam Sparks & George 
Butts, Disappearing Juries and Jury Verdicts, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 289, 313 (2006) (chiding fellow 
judges for their disregard of jury decision-making); William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing 
Juries, Vanishing Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 67, 89–90 (2006) (offering practical advice to 
fellow judges on how to keep trying civil cases). 
 28. See L. Camille Hébert, Sexual Harassment is Gender Harassment, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 565, 
591 (1995) (“Certainly, the language of [Title VII] . . . does not indicate that there is a de minimus [sic] 
threshold for actionable discrimination.”). A partial exception to this generalization is present in the law 
governing hostile work environment claims, which frequently call for judgments about magnitude. See 
supra note 21. Here the civil rights statutes as construed by the Supreme Court do empower courts to 
deem an allegation too trivial for redress, provided they link this conclusion to an assessment of the 
environment as a whole. See infra Part II.B.1.  
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I.  “BROKEN WINDOWS” AS METAPHOR AND REPARATIVE TECHNIQUE 
Understanding relatively small wrongs in terms of broken windows 
suggests the value of redressing them. Striving for fidelity to a major source, I 
recount here the broken windows hypothesis as its originators, the political 
scientist James Q. Wilson and the social worker-criminologist George L. 
Kelling,29 laid it out in a classic Atlantic Monthly article. Wilson and Kelling 
brought the broken windows metaphor to urban police work. Their innovation 
as described here underlies the argument I expound at the end of Part II: 
Privately initiated civil rights litigation is an excellent venue for broken 
windows enforcement of the law. 
A.  The Hypothesis 
The broken windows vantage point casts familiar phenomena―both 
problems and solutions―in newer terms. I consider six of these phenomena 
below. 
1.  Disorder (in Contradistinction to Crime)  
Wilson and Kelling contrast crime with a different social problem: “being 
bothered by disorderly people.”30 Observers trained to study legal doctrine, 
law enforcement, or any of the social sciences will more typically examine 
crime, which contains discrete elements―the better for replication and cross-
situational comparison―rather than the vaguer category of “being bothered.” 
Though necessarily replete with ambiguity, the text of a penal code is 
relatively straightforward compared to disorder. Disorder can look like a 
projection―the inside of someone’s head―rather than an external, 
measurable phenomenon. Wilson and Kelling nevertheless maintain that both 
crime and disorder are separate sources of “very real” fear.31 
2.  Order 
The contrast to disorder is public “order,” another description that presents 
difficulties of definition and observation. Wilson and Kelling invoke order 
negatively, claiming that order results when disorder is curbed or controlled. 
In a book-length expansion of Broken Windows, Kelling and his co-author 
(and spouse) Catherine M. Coles identify “a pervasive sense among citizens 
that community life in their own neighborhoods was not what it ought to 
be.”32 This version of order includes “a modicum of civility and safety for 
                                                                                                                          
 29. For their biographies, see http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/academics/faculty/default.htm?  
faculty=james_wilson; http://www.newark.rutgers.edu/ourfaculty/index.php?sId=kudosDetail&expert  
Id=43. 
 30. Atlantic Monthly, supra note 23, at 30. 
 31. Id. at 29. Kelling went on to define disorder as “incivility, boorish and threatening behavior 
that disturbs life, especially urban life.” GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, BROKEN 
WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 14 (1996). 
 32. Id. at 108. 
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ordinary citizens who travel daily along streets and by public transportation to 
work, to school, to shop, in pursuit of all the ordinary activities of everyday 
life.”33  
3.   Order and Disorder as Transitions  
Broken windows identifies two kinds of transition, one bad and one good. 
Unrepaired broken windows embody the bad kind, a slide from order to 
disorder. Policymakers can reverse this decline and lead a transition from 
disorder to order. Police officers―preferably on foot and visible―are their 
agents. Ordinary citizens join the endeavor of installing order but cannot 
achieve it unaided.34 
4.  From Small to Large 
The project of moving toward order rests on a premise that small units of 
disorder, left alone or undisturbed, will generate big negative effects. Trivial 
of themselves, these instances of disorder send a larger “signal that no one 
cares.”35 Miscreants feel at least empowered, and perhaps inspired, to make 
trouble when they see signs of disorder. Because breaking windows “has 
always been fun,”36 communities that want to foster order need the deterrence 
message that intact windows deliver. 
5.  Bad Behavior Emboldened 
Emboldening causes the transition from small harms to large. When a 
window breaks and stays broken, Wilson and Kelling continue, the quotidian 
devastation starts to escalate. “Adults stop scolding rowdy children; the 
children, emboldened, become more rowdy. Families move out; unattached 
adults move in. Teenagers gather in front of the corner store. The merchant 
asks them to move; they refuse. Fights occur.”37 The new behaviors are, in the 
aggregate, disorder.  
6.  Alienation 
Although disorder is not crime, people who live amidst this much 
burgeoning decay will feel that “crime, especially violent crime, is on the rise, 
and they will modify their behavior accordingly.”38 Engagement with 
strangers becomes menacing to them. Residents of the broken windows 
neighborhood stay off their streets as much as they can. When they have to be 
                                                                                                                          
 33. Id. 
 34. Harcourt, Reflecting, supra note 24, at 308.  
 35. Atlantic Monthly, supra note 23, at 31. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 32. Wilson and Kelling imply that although some of these behaviors may amount to 
misdemeanors, none of them constitute “crime” in the sense that citizens think they mean when they 
refer to an increase in the crime rate. See id.  
 38. Id. at 32. 
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out, they will hurry past other people they see, taking a defensive stance.  
Fear begets alienation. The slogan “don’t get involved” starts to guide 
citizens not only when they witness untoward incidents, Wilson and Kelling 
argue, but also in their entire relationship with their neighborhood. Residents 
have homes―bounded spaces of their own behind locked doors―but for them 
the neighborhood no longer exists, except perhaps “for a few reliable friends 
whom they arrange to meet.”39 
Alienation in the neighborhood comes to include alienation from the law 
itself. Because residents equate disorder with crime, they conclude that police 
officers who fail to abate disorder in response to a call are failing to enforce 
the criminal law and allowing crime to flourish. These residents may stop 
calling the police. In turn, police officers, lacking a chance to talk to non-
disorderly locals, may conclude that “the residents are animals who deserve 
each other.”40 
B.  The Critique 
Resistance to the broken windows hypothesis to guide law enforcement 
includes both conceptual and empirical challenges that are of interest beyond 
criminology. 
1.  A Problematic Metaphor about Order and Disorder  
Any policy recommendation cast in metaphorical terms raises a threshold 
question of how to interpret the metaphor. For example, when one academic 
defender of the broken windows hypothesis wrote that broken windows as 
exemplars of disorder “need to be repaired quickly,”41 he left opaque the 
details of what call for a fast fix.42 How does anyone know that the object 
faced constitutes a broken window rather than an insignificant flaw?43 Is the 
problem with broken windows that they languish too long unrepaired after 
breaking or that someone broke them in the first place? Does recognition of 
metaphorical broken windows in an environment justify prophylaxis―that is, 
measures to prevent the re-emergence of these manifestations―or only repair? 
Vagueness about order follows this vagueness about disorder.  
Returning to the source provides only limited guidance. The Atlantic 
                                                                                                                          
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 33.  
 41. See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE: CRIME AND THE SPIRAL OF URBAN DECAY 
IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 75 (1990). 
 42. Kelling himself has addressed this trouble with his metaphor. See Sousa & Kelling, supra 
note 23, at 78–79 (noting that “the broken windows metaphor is expressed not just in words, but in day-
to-day action . . . .” and that applications of the metaphor may not “adhere to the spirit, philosophy, and 
intent of the original broken windows argument”). 
 43. See generally Charis E. Kubrin, Making Order Out of Disorder: A Call for Conceptual 
Clarity, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 203, 204 (2008) (criticizing broken windows theorists for failing 
to define disorder). 
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Monthly manifesto began with praise for a foot-patrol technique used in New 
Jersey during the 1970s as part of a Safe and Clean Neighborhoods Program. 
Police chiefs resisted foot patrol, uniformed officers did not want to 
participate, and crime rates did not drop when the program was installed. 
Nevertheless, a “carefully controlled experiment” found that residents felt 
more secure, had a better impression of the police, and believed that crime had 
been reduced (although it had not).44 Foot-patrol officers, in turn, reported 
more job satisfaction and a higher regard for neighborhood residents than did 
their counterparts in patrol cars.45 The “carefully controlled experiment” 
therefore could proclaim that broken windows was a success.46 
Even if these Newark-based conclusions are accurate and can be extended 
to other urban settings, at least two questions remain: First, what do the police 
do literally when they repair broken windows figuratively? Second, given 
mixed results in the Newark mother lode, how do reformers know that they 
have effected improvement? Wilson and Kelling justified the Safe and Clean 
Neighborhoods Program by arguing that street crime accounts for only part of 
what citizens fear on the street. These citizens have a “fear of being bothered 
by disorderly people. Not violent people, nor, necessarily, criminals, but 
disreputable or obstreperous or unpredictable people: panhandlers, drunks, 
addicts, rowdy teenagers, prostitutes, loiterers, the mentally disturbed.”47 A 
judgment of success thus becomes possible by redefining the problem. 
The broken windows prescription has been imprecise from the start about 
which actions law enforcers ought to take and which results will indicate that 
a police intervention has succeeded.48 For specifics, George Kelling had 
walked the streets of Newark alongside a police officer, dubbed “Kelly,” to 
observe how a broken windows cop deals with disorderly people.49 Even with 
details about Kelly’s patrols filled in, the article’s title stays strictly metaphor: 
                                                                                                                          
 44. Atlantic Monthly, supra note 23, at 29. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 30. 
 48. Id. at 30–31. For example, researchers affiliated with Harvard and Suffolk universities 
sought to test the broken windows hypothesis by focusing on crime in Lowell, Massachusetts. The study 
identified thirty-four “crime hot spots” and divided these locations into two groups. The experimental 
group received numerous interventions; the control group experienced no changes in its policing and 
services. The study concluded that “[c]leaning up the physical environment was very effective; 
misdemeanor arrests less so; and boosting social services had no apparent impact” on the measure 
studied, calls to the police. Carolyn Y. Johnson, Breakthrough on ‘Broken Windows,’ BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 8, 2009, at Al. Though touted as a demonstration of broken windows’ validity, the study also 
shows the futility of misdemeanor arrests, which are a staple of this approach to crime, and gives little 
direct guidance to other municipalities about which measures to adopt. 
 49. The residents were black and the police officer was white. Kelling watched Kelly permit 
drunks to sit on stoops but not let them lie down. Kelly would ask loiterers to state their business and 
ordered them away when they gave unsatisfactory answers. He arrested people for vagrancy if they 
bothered anyone at a bus stop; he permitted drinking only from papers bags and on side streets. Atlantic 
Monthly, supra note 23, at 31.  
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no Newark windows are described in the Atlantic Monthly as intact or 
broken.50 
As the criminologist and legal scholar Bernard Harcourt has argued, the 
Newark-style policing that Wilson and Kelling praise may itself be understood 
as disorder. The distinction between formal crimes and harder to define 
instances or agents of disorder requires police to respond flexibly. If “there is 
such a clear line separating order from disorder,” Harcourt asks, “then why do 
the police need so much discretion? Wouldn’t disorder be immediately 
apparent to anyone? To a review board? To an administrative panel?”51 
Harcourt lists some activities that might amount to disorder: casual littering, 
hanging out, spontaneous begging, kicking an empty Coke can on the ground 
or, moving a bit further, public urination and riding a bus or train without 
paying the fare.52 As for the absence of these sights, Harcourt speculates about 
what order in a neighborhood might manifest: Perhaps the neighborhood is “a 
commercial sex strip and the owners and operators want johns to feel safe and 
welcome. Or it could signal a strong Mafia presence. Or maybe a lot of 
wealth. Or maybe a strong police presence. Or maybe police brutality.”53 
Because “order” and “disorder” are so indeterminate and contradictory, 
Harcourt argues, the function of broken windows law enforcement becomes a 
Foucauldian creation of “the disorderly subject.” It is “the whole biography of 
the disorderly person, rather than the criminal act . . . [that facilitates] a policy 
of surveillance, control, relocation, and exclusion of the disorderly.”54 Michel 
Foucault, upending a sociology that Emile Durkheim had laid down to 
describe and justify the category of order,55 insisted that criminal sanctions do 
more than legitimate commonly held understandings that unite individuals 
into societies. Foucault inverted this conventional causality and claimed that 
order comes before community norms; indeed, order creates entire categories 
of individuals.56  
Applying its binary of disorder-and-order to characterize a range of 
ambiguous behaviors, broken windows strengthens an authoritarian tendency 
in civic culture. Foucault in Discipline and Punish had described a carceral 
criminology that uses surveillance and punishment to imprint the body of a 
                                                                                                                          
 50. In a 2001 paper, George Kelling used misdemeanor arrests as a proxy for broken windows 
law enforcement. George L. Kelling & William H. Sousa, Do Police Matter? An Analysis of the Impact 
of New York City’s Police Reforms, Manhattan Institute for Policy Research, Dec. 22, 2001, available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/cr_22.pdf. But see supra note 48 (including police measures 
other than misdemeanor arrests in the broken windows classification). 
 51. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 129. 
 52. Id. at 130. 
 53. Id. at 132. 
 54. Harcourt, Reflecting, supra note 24, at 365. 
 55. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 138–42 (citing MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: 
THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1975)). 
 56. Id. at 141. 
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disciplined subject.57 Critics identify a similar force in broken windows 
criminology: A law enforcement apparatus stares at human beings; it looks for 
provocations and then swoops down to punish.  
2.  Entrenching Discrimination  
Broken windows law enforcement could, in principle, extend beyond its 
present reaches. For example, “order maintenance” could include tough 
enforcement of crimes like paying a house worker under the table, avoiding 
sales tax, insider trading, insurance misrepresentation, and taking office 
supplies home without permission.58 An advocate of broken windows 
approaches to law enforcement typically will not try to apply the approach to 
such behaviors, even though all of them violate positive law and might 
encourage more lawbreaking if observed. Nor is police brutality understood as 
a broken window that demands repair,59 even though conspicuous lawlessness 
by police might plausibly beget escalations of this wrong. Instead, broken 
windows law enforcement is overwhelmingly applied to poor people and 
people of color.  
Youth curfews and police stops based on intuitions that fall short of 
reasonable suspicion impose detriments that are at least correlated with, if not 
based on, race.60 Starting with “Kelly,” the Newark police officer whom 
George Kelling trailed in the 1970s, through current urban implementations, 
police officers who effect a broken windows policy will stop and detain 
disorderly looking people.61 Only by stopping a putative offender can police 
officers decide whether to arrest him or otherwise impede whatever jarring 
behavior caught their eye. Police stops have a long association with race 
discrimination, and “observed patterns of stop and frisk activity” align with 
race more than with the neutral architectural feature that gave this technique 
its metaphorical name.62  
Poverty and race in combination have made urban broken windows law 
enforcement especially disquieting. For decades, writes social critic Barbara 
Ehrenreich, “whole communities have been effectively ‘profiled’ for the 
suspicious combination of being dark-skinned and poor, thanks to the ‘broken 
windows’ or ‘zero tolerance’ theory of policing.”63 One study of broken 
                                                                                                                          
 57. Id. at 148–50. 
 58. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 130. 
 59. Id. at 131. 
 60. Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Conduct “Outside the Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 
94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 630 (2006). 
 61. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race and Disorder 
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 457 (2000). 
 62. Id. at 459. 
 63. Barbara Ehrenreich, Is It Now a Crime to Be Poor?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2009, at WK 9. See 
also Fighting Tidy Whites: Broken Windows and a Capitol Hill Graffiti Cleanup, Mar. 3, 2007, 
available at http://firewitchrising.blogspot.com/2007/03/fightin-tidy-whites-broken-windows-and.html 
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windows, as applied in Baltimore, concluded that it increased race-based and 
economic burdens that had already blighted the lives of city residents.64 
Although broken windows law enforcement need not necessarily rely only on 
misdemeanor arrests,65 the Baltimore version chose this device as a first-line 
response to disorder rather than as a last or later resort. Arrests for loitering 
and failure to obey the police filled the Baltimore station houses,66 increasing 
local tensions and harming the employment prospects of poor individuals who 
acquired a broken windows misdemeanor criminal record.67 Another study 
found that perceptions of disorder in a neighborhood increased when the 
visible presence of African-American persons there increased, even if 
objective measures of increased disorder were absent.68 
Reviewing the broken windows literature with attention to race and class 
suggests that some empirical claims about improvement rest on a selective 
reading of the record.69 A defender of the technique might, for example, 
correctly point out that reported rates of a particular crime dropped following 
a broken windows intervention. This defender would likely overlook 
detriments that accompanied the improved crime rate. Community mistrust of 
the police, alienation from law enforcement aspirations, and feelings of 
powerlessness and defeat might have increased, Richard Delgado argues, 
shifting inversely in relation to a crime rate drop the police had pursued.70 An 
increase in negative feelings might matter more than the decline of a particular 
reported offense.  
3.  Scant Improvements 
Claims made about the power of broken windows law enforcement 
demand attention to causality. A result can follow from an antecedent without 
having been caused by it: post hoc, logicians remind us, does not necessarily 
demonstrate propter hoc. Aware that correlation is not causation, social 
scientists have tried to measure the utility of broken windows techniques. 
Their findings are equivocal. 
                                                                                                                          
(“Broken Windows is nothing more than lipstick on the same old racial profiling pig.”). 
 64. Reed Collins, Strolling While Poor: How Broken-Windows Policing Created New Crime in 
Baltimore, 14 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 419 (2007). 
 65. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (reporting other broken-windows applications in 
Lowell, Massachusetts). 
 66. Collins, supra note 64, at 425. 
 67. Id. at 431. 
 68. Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and 
the Social Construction of Broken Windows, 67 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 319 (2004). Both African-American 
and white respondents evidenced this bias. Id. at 332. 
 69. Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and 
Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193 (2005); see generally K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken 
Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 271, 299–315 (2009) (reviewing detriments to individuals and society). 
 70. Delgado, supra note 69, at 1250. 
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Because the connection between broken windows law enforcement and 
crime reduction is difficult to prove, researchers have assigned themselves the 
somewhat easier task of exploring the connection between disorder and 
serious crime. The criminologist Wesley Skogan compared disorder and crime 
statistics in forty urban neighborhoods spread over six large American cities.71 
Skogan found a positive association between disorder and crime that was not 
explained by other variables like “poverty, instability and race.”72 Bernard 
Harcourt, studying the same data, found that when he removed Newark from 
the cities studied, the association mostly disappeared.73 Broken windows 
advocates, in turn, have faulted Harcourt for deeming Newark an outlier; 
removing different outlier neighborhoods from the data set would have 
strengthened the hypothesis.74  
Even if visible disorder increases street crime, as proponents of broken 
windows policing contend, the more difficult next step of the crime-control 
thesis, its inverse, remains: How do policymakers know ex ante that 
encouraging police officers to focus on disorder will decrease crime? 
Numerous variables often confound the claim of causality. 
The New York experience in the 1990s―broken windows law 
enforcement first, a drop in street crime second―has presented the most 
conspicuous case study. In Freakonomics, a bestseller exploring “the stuff and 
riddles of everyday life,”75 Steven D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner drew up a 
list of popular explanations for the crime-rate plunge in the United States. 
“Innovative policing strategies” led the list in newspaper mentions, ahead of 
other possibilities (e.g., aging of the population, a stronger economy, tougher 
gun control).76 “Innovative policing strategies” are exemplified by broken 
windows as New York police commissioner William Bratton and Rudolph 
Giuliani, the then-mayor, had applied the strategy, and journalists continue to 
credit this technique for causing a drop in crime that exceeded the crime rate 
drop around the country. Levitt and Dubner reject this near-consensus of the 
media.77 Other social scientists have published their own skepticism about the 
association between this antecedent and consequences.78 Summarizing the 
                                                                                                                          
 71. See SKOGAN, supra note 41, at 73–77. 
 72. See Sousa & Kelling, supra note 23, at 83. 
 73. HARCOURT, Reflecting, supra note 24, at 323–25.  
 74. Sousa & Kelling, supra note 23, at 84 (emphasis in original). Both sides agree that the rate 
of one crime in particular, robbery, increases when visible disorder increases. Id. 
 75. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES 
THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING xi (2005). 
 76. Id. at 120–21. 
 77. Id. at 128–30; see also Radley Balko, The Other Broken Windows Fallacy, Reason.com, 
Mar. 8, 2010, http://reason.com/archives/2010/03/08/the-other-broken-window-fallac (noting that 
“many big cities that didn’t adopt the policy, including San Diego, Washington, D.C., and Houston, had 
more significant decreases in the homicide rate over about the same period”). 
 78. See generally Thacher, supra note 24, at 384 (observing that “social science has not been 
kind to the broken-windows theory” as a source of crime control). 
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data on Wilson and Kelling’s prescription, one defender of broken windows 
policing agrees that the link between disorder and reported crime is weak.79  
C.  Broken Windows Distilled to Its Uncontroversial Elements 
Though comprehensive, criticisms of the broken windows hypothesis leave 
portions of the construct still intact and compelling. Policymakers attuned to 
the value of broken windows can choose a partial or selective retention 
following decades of antipathy in print. We may now consider what remains.80  
Overstatements and large promises from devotees―for instance, claims 
about broken windows policing as a robust source of reduced 
crime―probably should be trimmed. Race- and class-based oppressions have 
certainly accompanied applications of the policy and warrant disapproval. 
“Disorder” still has no agreed upon definition. After this retrenchment, 
however, critics and proponents of broken windows hold some ground in 
common. 
1.  Affronts and Social Meaning  
One key point of accord between proponents and critics is agreement about 
the expressive effects of prohibitions and responses to affronts. Insofar as 
broken windows theorists “have pushed criminal justice to take the social 
meaning turn,” writes critic Bernard Harcourt, “they are to be applauded.”81 
Broken windows advocate Dan Kahan agrees and commends the launch of 
other policies, including and beyond broken windows, “aimed at regulating 
social meaning.”82 By way of explaining social meaning, Kahan continues: 
“Laws that regulate social norms determine the background against which 
private behavior conveys information about citizens’ beliefs and intentions.”83 
Kahan concludes that “a community is more likely to be law abiding when its 
members perceive that it is.”84 The notion of expressive meaning, central to 
the broken windows metaphor, is congenial to both critics and adherents. 
As understood in this consensus, any message that harm-causing behavior 
will be expected and tolerated lowers the cost of such transgressions to 
individuals. Formal punishments might eventually follow, but persons present 
at the time of the offense observe flourishing rather than a negative response 
                                                                                                                          
 79. Sousa & Kelling, supra note 23, at 85–89. Sousa and Kelling also point out that a weak 
association between disorder and crime does not necessarily counsel against broken-windows policing 
because the strategy may have other benefits. Id. at 87. 
 80. Cf. Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics?, 64 MD. L. REV. 303, 324–
27 (2005) (exploring “what little remains” of law and economics following extensive scholarly 
criticism). 
 81. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 217. 
 82. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 394 
(1993). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 295 (emphasis in original). 
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that produces deterrence. Accordingly, these observers “are likely to infer that 
the risks of such behavior are small and the potential rewards high.”85 
Finding social meaning in behaviors is only the start of what Harcourt has 
praised as the turn to social meaning. Researchers, argues Harcourt, ought to 
build on their explorations of “the social meaning of practices such as juvenile 
gun possession or gang membership” to reach “the social meaning of the 
proposed policing techniques and policies themselves.”86 This 
recommendation encourages a more serious engagement with the premise of 
broken windows rather than an abandonment of the premise. Harcourt insists 
that “proving social meaning” requires “a rich contextual analysis of multiple 
meanings and countermeanings, an analysis that intersects with and deepens 
other compelling accounts of social meaning,” to be “corroborated as much as 
possible by statistical analyses.”87 Antagonists would agree, continues 
Harcourt, “at this theoretical level.”88 Indeed, the only salient disagreement 
over social meaning between broken windows adherents and critics centers 
around which meanings to investigate. Adherents emphasize affronts; critics 
want to extend the inquiry beyond the infraction-and-response law 
enforcement dynamic. But while arguing for new sites to investigate, critics 
accept the summary about social meaning that Kahan offered from the side 
that accepts the broken windows hypothesis: “[P]rivate behavior conveys 
information about citizens’ beliefs and intentions.”89 
Broken windows thus is uncontroversial when it declares that visible or 
otherwise manifested conditions convey meaning within societies and that 
individuals receive guidance on how to act from these manifestations. 
Adherents and critics agree that what people do―“private behavior,” in 
Kahan’s phrase―extends beyond the individuals who have participated 
directly or voluntarily in a transaction. Social context makes behaviors 
intelligible.90  
                                                                                                                          
 85. Id. at 356. Exploring this theme of tacit encouragement to do wrong, Kahan has cautioned 
lawyers not to presume that formal legal prohibition constitutes a social meaning of true disapproval. 
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 593 (1996). 
 86. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 225. 
 87. Bernard E. Harcourt, After the “Social Meaning Turn”: Implications for Research Design 
and Methods of Proof in Contemporary Criminal Law Policy Analysis, 34 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 179, 181 
(2000). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 90. Sexuality offers countless examples. See, e.g., HANNE BLANK, VIRGINITY: THE UNTOUCHED 
HISTORY 3 (2007) (“By any material reckoning, virginity does not exist.”); MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE 
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (1978) (arguing that only slowly over time did homosexuality evolve toward 
a personal identity, away from a description of acts deemed aberrant). A newer example of how context 
makes sexual behaviors intelligible comes from the Secret Lover Collection, a line of romantic greeting 
cards marketed to clandestine couples. See http://www.secretlovercollection.com. Customers who buy 
the merchandise must use e-mail addresses and credit cards, even though they presumably risk discovery 
thereby. The premise of this consumer product is that Hallmark-card expressions of love, omitting the 
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2.  Coarsening Sensibilities 
Both critics and advocates of broken windows focus, in different ways, on 
the reactions, judgments, self-conceptions, and strategies of individuals 
immersed in environments. For Bernard Harcourt at the end of Illusion of 
Order, these human responses affect not just the clusters of people that policy 
studies aggregate―the homeless, the police, gangs, juvenile delinquents, and 
citizens―but also human beings as subjects, with researchers not excepted.91 
Among the effects that interest critics are the consequences of order-
maintenance policing, which can include effects on children’s development, 
race relations, treatment of unemployed people, and the views that citizens 
who live in homes have of homeless people.92  
This theme of coarsening sensibilities―the idea that pervasive disorder 
dulls responses to conditions that people feel they ought to care about and that 
their culture regards as important―emerges in both views on broken 
windows. Take, for example, an illustration used by both sides of the dispute: 
the broken windows tactic of increasing misdemeanor arrests of street 
prostitutes. Wilson and Kelling mentioned the necessity of these misdemeanor 
arrests back in their seminal 1982 publication,93 and Rudolph Giuliani 
followed the prescription, reducing the number of street prostitutes in 
Manhattan by about two-thirds following a broken windows arrest initiative.94  
The premise is that prostitutes on the street convey a sense of deterioration 
to law-abiding participants who share this space. “It turns out, in fact,” retorts 
Harcourt, “that prostitution may be related to crime in a more direct way than 
the broken windows theory immediately suggests”:95 Assailants rape and beat 
street prostitutes at an extraordinarily high rate.96 Whether Harcourt’s 
conclusion―that it would be better to legalize prostitution than to arrest street 
prostitutes97―is correct matters not: the point about coarsening sensibilities is 
that what New York officials called a quality-of-life initiative left the 
prostitutes’ quality of life in a bad state. The law enforcement policy of 
scrubbing the streets of this scourge may have contributed to a disregard for 
the welfare of these individuals, just as broken windows, in the Wilson and 
Kelling metaphor, coarsen the judgment of residents as they confront their 
own neighborhood. 
For their part, advocates of broken windows law enforcement identify a 
more basic and unitary kind of coarsening, a finding that researchers have 
                                                                                                                          
illicit context, do not adequately describe what unites the couple. 
 91. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 218–21. 
 92. Id. at 218. 
 93. Atlantic Monthly, supra note 23, at 31. 
 94. Bernard Cohen, Civil Order Crime, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 235, 238 
(David Levinson ed., 2002). 
 95. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 221. 
 96. Id. (citations omitted). 
 97. Id. at 221–22. 
2010] CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS = BROKEN WINDOWS 913 
 
been able to replicate and support. Wilson and Kelling described the 
consequences of broken windows as dejection and withdrawal from 
communal life. Citizens come to avoid public spaces and one another, refrain 
from speaking up when they see a disturbance, avert their eyes, and write off 
their neighborhood as all but obliterated.98 Fear turns them off and shuts them 
down. Critics of broken windows have not disagreed, and substantial accord 
has been published in the decades following the Atlantic Monthly debut of 
broken windows as a source of psychological corrosion. Researchers confirm 
the effect of perceived decay and disorder on individual consciousness.99  
An acclaimed return to broken windows empiricism, undertaken in the 
Netherlands and published in Science in 2008, sought expressly to study the 
hypothesis in the context of psychology and sociology, rather than crime 
control.100 The chief researcher found that graffiti and strewn about shopping 
carts increased individuals’ tendencies to litter, as did the sound of (illegal) 
fireworks nearby. Surrounding an area with garbage increased the rate of theft 
from a mailbox. Tracked down by a reporter to comment on these findings, 
the leading critic of broken windows theory scoffed―but also conceded the 
point about coarsened sensibilities.101 
Social scientists have validated this point of agreement among scholars of 
broken windows. Environments, they report, impel individuals to engage in 
harmful behaviors that these persons would have eschewed if the 
environmental cues were absent. Working separately, the psychologists 
Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo found devastating effects of signals that 
harmful behavior is acceptable or normal. A mentally healthy individual can 
be prompted to engage in both memorable cruelty, as Milgram reported, and 
banal acts of property damage, as detailed by Zimbardo.102 One psychologist 
who replicated Stanley Milgram’s chilling 1963 findings―that individuals 
will administer severe electric shocks to strangers as punishment for 
answering questions wrong―attributed these consistent outcomes to 
                                                                                                                          
 98. Atlantic Monthly, supra note 23. 
 99. See Timothy J. Haney, Broken Windows and Self-Esteem: Subjective Understandings of 
Neighborhood Poverty and Disorder, 36 SOC. SCI. RES. 968 (2007) (relating disordered environments to 
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situational features, which extend beyond authority to environments more 
generally.103 
3.  Deterioration as a Social Phenomenon  
Although “social meaning” can cover a large array of affronts, the 
disturbances that occupy this Article are the ones that convey collapse, decay, 
or an end to constraints that had once reduced misbehaviors. We have already 
considered the portion of this hypothesis that is contested: Recall Harcourt’s 
insistence that police officers can install disorder, and that what looks like 
order in a neighborhood might instead be the tidiness of well-organized 
crime.104 Focusing on accord between the proponents and opponents of broken 
windows theory, rather than controversy, shows that both accommodate the 
idea of a negative change, or social deterioration. 
Quoted with approval by their main antagonist, George Kelling and 
Catherine Coles write that “[d]isorder demoralizes communities, undermines 
commerce, leads to the abandonment of public spaces, and undermines public 
confidence in the ability of government to solve problems . . . .”105 Broken 
windows critics Robert J. Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush agree that 
the concept of disorder helps to explain “migration patterns, investment by 
business, and overall neighborhood visibility.”106 Even social scientists 
frustrated with the vagueness and indeterminacy of the term seem to know it 
when they see it. 
One critic of the broken windows hypothesis, criminologist Ralph B. 
Taylor, writes that the broken windows “is conceptually grounded in the 
incivilities thesis,” which in turn maintains that “physical deterioration and 
disorderly social conduct each contribute independently to fear, neighborhood 
decline, and crime.”107 Consequently, “incivility reducing initiatives will 
contribute to neighborhood stability and safety, reducing fear.”108 When 
Taylor goes on to suggest that “this logic model is inaccurate, inadequate, or 
potentially misleading,”109 he also insists that the goals of broken windows 
policing―public safety, stability, and responsiveness―warrant pursuit.110 His 
chapter showcases a broken windows antagonist who argues that preventive 
                                                                                                                          
 103. Adam Cohen, Four Decades After Milgram, We’re Still Willing to Inflect Pain, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 28, 2008, at 24 (quoting study author). 
 104. HARCOURT, supra note 24, at 132. 
 105. Id. at 212 (quoting KELLING & COLES, supra note 31, at 242). 
 106. Id. (quoting Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Systematic Social Observation 
of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods, 105 AM. J. SOC. 603, 637 (1999)).  
 107. Ralph B. Taylor, Incivilities Reduction Policing, Zero Tolerance, and the Retreat from 
Coproduction: Weak Foundations and Strong Pressures, in POLICY INNOVATION: CONTRASTING 
PERSPECTIVES 98, 98 (David A. Weisburd & Anthony A. Braga eds., 2006). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 106–08 (defending “coproduction,” whereby civilian residents of a neighborhood 
produce order alongside the police, not as targets of law enforcement). 
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repair is the best response to early-stage social deterioration.  
II.  APPLYING BROKEN WINDOWS TO CIVIL RIGHTS 
We may now explore three distinct ways in which the broken windows 
metaphor applies to civil rights violations. First, instances of unlawful 
discrimination, when left unchecked and unremedied, can lead to larger 
harms. Second, even though civil rights statutes typically contain no official 
requirement that claims be large, judges have construed the category of a 
violation too trivial to deserve their attention: this construct resembles the 
broken windows of which James Wilson and George Kelling wrote. At the 
end of this Part, I shall claim, as do proponents of broken windows street 
policing, that paying attention to relatively small affronts would enhance the 
rule of law.  
A.  Discriminatory Conditions as Broken Windows  
The elements of broken windows as proffered in Broken Windows―which 
have been listed in Part I with six labels: disorder in contradistinction to 
crime; order; order and disorder as transitions; from small to large; bad 
behavior emboldened; and alienation111―also serve to describe discriminatory 
conditions that onlookers can observe. Aspects of the broken windows 
hypothesis that both adherents and critics accept as correct―affronts and 
social meaning; coarsening sensibilities; and deterioration as a social 
phenomenon―are also manifest in a civil rights setting. Yet, whereas the 
description of broken windows carries over from neighborhoods to civil 
rights, criticisms of broken windows policy on the street do not impede a civil 
rights application.112  
The parallels to broken windows gathered in this subpart as examples are 
all small manifestations that can loom large and have won attention in 
antidiscrimination efforts. Resemblances to the broken windows of street 
policing vary. Some small instances of discrimination generate larger harms. 
Others evince a significant problem even though they are relatively slight. 
Some contexts invite what might be called repaired or unbroken 
windows―small interventions that serve progressive ends when people can 
observe them. 
1.  Race Discrimination  
Writing during a postwar period of horror about the Holocaust, the 
psychologist Gordon Allport theorized that discrimination―defined as 
behaviors and actions that originate in prejudice―proceeds from small to 
large on a five-point scale.113 In size-place order, the stages are antilocution, 
                                                                                                                          
 111. See supra Part I.A. 
 112. See infra Part II.C. 
 113. GORDON ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 52 (1979) (original ed. 1954). “Allport’s 
916 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
or what might be called hate speech; avoidance, where the majority shuns the 
oppressed group; discrimination, where hostile attitudes take form in concrete 
actions; physical attack; and extermination.114 Though somewhat out of the 
contemporary social science mainstream,115 and not equally pertinent to all 
categories of social prejudice,116 Allport’s scale offers a cogent and 
historically grounded account of small civil rights violations as constitutive of 
larger harm to racial or ethnic minorities. 
The social meanings of racist messages or displays underlie measures 
designed to lessen their broken windows effects.117 Military culture offers an 
illustration. Manifested racism within the ranks of the U.S. military has 
spurred calls for zero-tolerance resistance, an approach that overlaps with 
broken windows.118 In its report titled “A Few Bad Men,” the Southern 
Poverty Law Center attributed an increase in the ranks of racist-extremist 
personnel to low standards in the “recruit-starved” armed forces.119 To address 
this problem, in A Few Bad Men the Southern Poverty Law Center 
recommended to the Pentagon not only a more mindful intake strategy by 
recruiters and other substantive measures (such as alertness to the illicit 
stockpiling of weapons that several neo-Nazi servicemen have pursued), but 
also “zero tolerance” for extremist behaviors that seem more innocuous, such 
as urging fellow service personnel to join racist cohorts and possessing 
extremist literature.  
Agreeing with this recommendation, one Defense Department study 
claimed that “even the non-violent activities of military personnel with 
extremist tendencies . . . can have deleterious consequences for the good 
                                                                                                                          
definition is actually the United Nations’ definition; discrimination is defined as any conduct based on 
distinction made on grounds of natural or social categories, which have no relation either to individual 
capacities or merits, or to the concrete behavior of the individual person.” SAMUEL ROUNDFIELD LUCAS, 
THEORIZING DISCRIMINATION IN AN ERA OF CONTESTED PREJUDICE: DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 177 (2008). 
 114. ALLPORT, supra note 113, at 14–15. 
 115. LUCAS, supra note 113, at 175–79 (observing that Allport’s model fell into decline following 
work by Gary Becker that described discrimination as an individual taste). 
 116. Avoidance and extermination are less likely, or at a minimum more complicated, when the 
oppressed group is women. 
 117. Hate speech, hate crimes, and racial profiling may be seen as other illustrations of social 
meanings present in racist displays. See generally Lu-in Wang, “Suitable Targets”? Parallels and 
Connections Between “Hate” Crimes and “Driving While Black,” 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 209, 228 
(2001) (“Both the discriminatory selection itself and the defensive behavior it encourages serve to 
reinforce the social context in which racial and other group-based targeting occur because they both 
influence expectations about how certain groups will be treated.”). 
 118. See Congressmen Davis, Engel Urge Rumsfeld to Apply Zero Tolerance to Racist Extremists 
in Our Military, July 26, 2006, available at http://colorofchange.org/military/davis_engel.h  
tml. On the overlap between zero tolerance and broken windows, see supra note 116 and accompanying 
text. 
 119. David Holthouse, A Few Bad Men, Southern Poverty Law Center Intelligence Project, July 
7, 2006, available at http://www.splcenter.org/intel/news/item.jsp?pid=79. 
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order, discipline, readiness, and cohesion of military units.”120 Although the 
military tolerates the continuing recruitment of neo-Nazis and similar 
extremists, who probably number in the thousands,121 at the same time it 
keeps alert to broken windows displays that mean little to most service 
personnel but generate fellowship among racist persons who unite after 
enlistment.122  
2.  Sex Discrimination123 
Efforts to reduce or discourage discrimination against women encounter 
resistance in conspicuous expressions of prejudice. Invidious discrimination 
on the basis of sex comes to appear rational, normal, and ineradicable; tiny 
instances of sexism loom large when they reinforce a message of 
comprehensive inferiority. The armed forces offer an illustration here just as 
they illustrate broken windows effects regarding racial hatred.124 
Commentators write that tolerating misogynous displays serves to deepen and 
entrench sexism in military culture and generate worse harms, including 
sexual harassment and rape.125  
Tolerated manifestations of discrimination can beget new harms in civilian 
society as well, just as tolerated blights in neighborhoods can increase larger 
blights.126 Images impart prescriptive messages that replicate gender 
oppression. Children’s literature, for example, promotes the subordination of 
women when it depicts agency in female characters as either malevolent 
(think of stepmothers and witches) or nonexistent.127 Researchers link media-
                                                                                                                          
 120. Id. (quoting Marc Flacks & Martin F. Wiskoff, Gangs, Extremist Groups, and the Military: 
Screening for Service, June 1998).  
 121. See id. (reporting one count of 320 extremists at a single base in Fort Lewis, Washington, 
housing 19,000 soldiers). 
 122. Examples of these displays include symbols in the Runic alphabet; the number 88, neo-Nazi 
code for Heil Hitler; the Schwartze Sonne, a graphic image; and the words White Power rendered in 
German. Id.  
 123. In this Article, I use the term “sex” to include gender and thereby comport with judicial 
interpretations of civil rights laws: sex discrimination here covers discrimination against women and 
also against persons perceived as homosexual, or as non-conforming to traditional gender divisions. See 
infra Part II.D.3. 
 124. Because of its cohesiveness and centralized control, the military is a locus of strong social 
meanings. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 125. CYNTHIA H. ENLOE, GLOBALIZATION AND MILITARISM: FEMINISTS MAKE THE LINK vii (2007); 
Madeline Morris, In War and Peace: Incidence and Implications of Rape by Military Personnel, in 
BEYOND ZERO TOLERANCE: DISCRIMINATION IN MILITARY CULTURE 173, 173 (Mary Fainsod Katzenstein 
& Judith Teppy eds., 1999).  
 126. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 127. JACK ZIPES, STICKS AND STONES: THE TROUBLESOME SUCCESS OF CHILDREN’S LITERATURE 
FROM SLOVENLY PETER TO HARRY POTTER 185 (2002) (arguing that this generalization applies even to 
the contemporary Harry Potter books, written by a woman and popular with girls); Ruth B. 
Bottigheimer, Silenced Women in the Grimms’ Tales: The ‘Fit’ Between Fairy Tales and Their 
Historical Context, in FAIRY TALES AND SOCIETY: ILLUSION, ALLUSION, AND PARADIGM 115, 127 (Ruth 
B. Bottigheimer ed., 1986) (observing that in the classic fairy tales, female characters ask no questions). 
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promoted imagery about appearance norms with an increase in dieting and 
eating disorders among preteen and teenage girls.128 Advertising in the United 
States inculcates “the cultural assumption that men are dominant and women 
are passive and subordinate,” according to one sociologist.129  
Social scientists have designed studies that serve to test broken windows-
like hypotheses in the context of sex discrimination. One experiment found 
that participants were more likely to withhold financial support for women’s 
organizations after exposure to sexist humor.130 An acclaimed quantitative 
model of gender bias at work exemplifies a variation on the small-to-large 
pattern that Wilson and Kelling associated with neighborhood deterioration:131 
Because many large workplaces arrange personnel in a pyramid shape, with a 
large tier at the bottom that competes for relatively few promotions, even a 
small quantity of discrimination at the lower tiers will lead to significant 
effects higher up. Researchers found that a tiny quantity of gender bias, 
accounting for only 1% of a variance, accrues upward, so that at the higher 
tiers only 35% of persons promoted would be women.132 
3.  Sexual-Orientation and Gender-Identity Discrimination  
The demographic here falls under the abbreviation LGBT and its variants: 
discrimination against individuals who are (or who are perceived to be) 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgendered. Although federal judges have 
generally agreed that sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination are 
not actionable under the Civil Rights Act,133 these categories of bias 
nevertheless may be understood as civil rights violations.134 Numerous state 
laws recognize LGBT discrimination in civil rights terms.135 
                                                                                                                          
 128. Fiona Bawdon, All Those Years of Feminism and Girls Still Expect to be Judged on Their 
Looks, THE TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at Features, p. 5.  
 129. ANTHONY J. CORTESE, PROVOCATEUR: IMAGES OF WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN ADVERTISING 58 
(3d ed. 2008). 
 130. Thomas E. Ford, Christie F. Boxer, Jacob Armstrong & Jessica R. Edel, More than “Just a 
Joke”: The Prejudice-Releasing Function of Sexist Humor, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 159 
(2007). 
 131. Richard F. Martell, David M. Lane, & Cynthia Emrich, Male-Female Differences: A 
Computer Simulation, 51 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 157 (1996).  
 132. Id. at 158. 
 133. See Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-
Conforming and Gender-Nonconforming Heterosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 471 
(2004) (noting the unvarying resistance of federal courts to sexual orientation discrimination claims); 
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081, 1085–86 (7th Cir. 1984) (summarizing case law and failed 
congressional initiatives to modify the Civil Rights Act). But see Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 
293, 306–08 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that even though courts have consistently held otherwise, the 
refusal to hire a transgendered person violates the plain language of Title VII and is sex discrimination). 
 134. Jennifer C. Hendricks, Instead of ENDA, A Course Correction for Title VII, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. COLLOQUY 209, 209–20 (2008) (reporting struggles in Congress to amend Title VII to include 
sexual orientation and gender identity). See also Andrew Altman, Civil Rights, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 3.2 (2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-
rights/#WhyDisUnj (surveying philosophical reasons that discrimination is wrong; most of these 
descriptors apply to sexual-orientation and gender-identity discrimination).  
 135. See David Crary, Civil Rights Act for Gays, Transsexuals Gains Momentum, NEWS J., Aug. 
2010] CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS = BROKEN WINDOWS 919 
 
Advocates of improved protections for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender youth have assembled evidence that condoning small affronts 
against these minorities has broken windows effects. Authorities often ignore 
sexual-orientation harassment in schools, implying to victims that they think 
what these students are experiencing is trivial and unworthy of official 
attention.136 Some administrators and teachers go further, siding overtly with 
bullies.137 
“Left unchecked,” according to two advocacy groups, “this harassment and 
discrimination may often escalate to the level of physical violence or violent 
crime.”138 One broken windows escalation that many survey respondents 
report having experienced is a shift from verbal to physical attacks in 
school.139 Conversely, the presence of gay-straight alliance student clubs has 
been associated with decreased levels of harassment and name calling.140 To 
continue the metaphor, a gay-straight alliance in a school that had manifested 
anti-gay hostility would be a repaired window. 
As for gender identity discrimination, this type of civil rights violation has 
received little recognition in the form of liability. Efforts in Congress to pass 
an amendment to the Civil Rights Act that would make sexual-orientation 
discrimination unlawful have foundered on many shoals.  Notable among the 
shoals has been a struggle over whether to include or exclude “T,” the 
transgendered, in amendments that extend civil rights protections to LGB 
persons.141 Given this dearth of doctrine, an exploration of gender-identity 
discrimination as broken windows must turn to theory. 
Gender-identity theorists have broached the possibility that here broken 
windows should refer to recognition of the category itself. In this analysis, 
transgendered persons remain oppressed because their crossing the gender 
binary threatens settled distributions and expectations. In a chapter 
provocatively titled “Compliance is Gendered,” one academic and civil rights 
                                                                                                                          
28, 2009, at N (reporting that twenty-one states recognize discrimination based on sexual orientation, 
and twelve include gender identity as a civil rights category). 
 136. See American Civil Liberties Union, Press Release, High School Student Takes on Anti-Gay 
Harassment—And Wins, May 18, 2009, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/youth/39607prs20090518.html (last 
visited June 18, 2010). 
 137. Human Rights Watch, Hatred in the Hallways: Violence and Discrimination Against 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Students in U.S. Schools (2001), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/uslgbt/toc.htm (hereinafter Hatred in the Hallways). 
 138. Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network and National Center for Lesbian Rights, 
Frequently Asked Questions on Safe School Policies (n.d.), http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/pol  
iciesfaq.pdf?docID=1664. 
 139. Human Rights Watch, supra note 137. 
 140. Gay-Straight Alliance Network, Questions and Answers (n.d), available at 
http://www.gsanetwork.org/press/GSANetworkFAQ.pdf; see also Benoit Denizet-Lewis, Coming Out in 
Middle School, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2009, Mag. at 36, 54 (quoting a middle school principal: “And the 
most amazing thing has happened since the G.S.A. started. Bullying of all kinds is way down. The 
G.S.A. created this pervasive anti-bullying culture on campus that affects everyone”). 
 141. See Hendricks, supra note 134, at 209.  
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lawyer writes that “almost all of the institutions and programs that exist to 
control and exploit poor people and people of color in the United States are 
sex segregated,” and that gender-crossers must have enough money for 
medical technologies before they can expect to be granted membership in the 
group they regard as their own.142 If compliance is gendered, then gender-
resisters are noncompliant and jarring, just as broken windows in a 
neighborhood are noncompliant and jarring. 
As another commentator elaborates, claims for the civil rights of 
transgendered persons challenge many sets of understandings, not just 
prejudice against those who as adults rejected the gender they were assigned 
in their infancy.143 Animus against these persons may be indefensible; but 
siding with them when they go to court—thus necessarily making reference to 
formal equality—also presents difficulties. Schroer v. Billington,144 the case 
that won attention in 2008 by holding that discrimination against a male-to-
female transsexual job applicant was sex discrimination, rests on a binary: 
after David crossed over to become Diane, Diane became entitled to all the 
rights David had held.145 Crossing genders emphasizes the oppressive 
boundary. And so, paradoxically, the transgendered person becomes one kind 
of broken window (a threat to orderly gender) to her adversaries and the 
opposite kind of broken window (the embodiment of a rigid, malevolent 
division) for her legal advocates, who report that to make a good impression 
in court, a transgendered person must conform to stereotypes, especially if the 
gender she has embraced is female.146 
4.  Disability Discrimination  
The broken windows hypothesis coupled with what disability theorists 
describe as “invisible disability” provide understandings that may be seen as 
reciprocal or mutually constitutive. Broken windows theorists have claimed 
that disorder undermines order, and interventions to bolster order done in 
small, visible steps increase both perceptions and realities of safety and 
security. Invisible disability has a similar function, with a small inversion. 
Whereas fixing broken windows in the criminology context has meant 
installing absences―scrubbing the streets of squeegee men, loiterers, drunks, 
                                                                                                                          
 142. Dean Spade, Compliance is Gendered: Struggling for Gender Self-Determination in a 
Hostile Economy, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 217, 220 (Paisley Currah, Richard M. Juang & Shannon 
Price Minter eds., 2006).  
 143. Andrew Gilden, Toward a More Transformative Approach: The Limits of Transgender 
Formal Equality, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUSTICE 83 (2008). 
 144. 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).  
 145. Id. at 306–07. 
 146. Gilden, supra note 143, at 103–04; Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the 
Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender That is More Inclusive of Transgender 
People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 297–98 (2005). See generally Symposium, Legal Gender: The 
Limitations of a Male-Female Binary, 30 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 288–356 (2009) (identifying 
inadequacies in current antidiscrimination law with respect to transgender issues). 
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prostitutes, graffiti, vandalized cars and so on―fixing broken windows for 
disability-related purposes installs presences, bolstering visibility. The newly 
visible disability becomes a repaired window, in this sense resembling a new 
gay-straight alliance in a hostile high school environment.147 
Individuals have more disabilities than are manifest; social practices, by 
obscuring and denying these conditions, make their consequences worse. Take 
mental illness for example. It is more prevalent than it appears.148 Affected 
individuals can blend in with majorities who manifest no mental disability. As 
a result, these individuals and persons close to them may regard the condition 
as rare and exotic―a state of being that precludes political alliances with the 
non-disabled, and on which public funds should not be spent. 
The analogy to repairing a broken window encourages (rather than 
suppresses) the display of conditions related to mobility and other functioning. 
Visible or not, a disability becomes easier to live with when one’s 
environment declares it no barrier to integration. Ramps next to, or instead of, 
a staircase bespeak more than one way to get around. Closed-caption 
television programming permits audiences to consume content through 
eyesight as well as hearing. Defibrillators testify to the existence of cardiac 
conditions, as do airport signs that offer pacemaker users alternatives to the 
metal detector. Reminders like these claim capaciousness inside a public 
space. Advocates of the locution “differently abled,” a phrase that never quite 
caught on, had a point: Social acceptance tells an individual that her 
characteristics and needs are all right, just different, rather than a badge of 
inferiority. She is welcome in public. Other people want her presence.149  
B.  Civil Rights Trivializations: What Judges Disparage 
as Too Small 
A central premise of civil rights legislation is that individuals hold positive 
rights, which are infringed in recurring contexts. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
depicted workplaces, schools, housing, places of public accommodation, and 
other settings as venues of potential oppression. Decades later, this potential 
to oppress remains in place, and notions of de minimis tell injured persons to 
suffer in silence rather than assert their entitlements. 
To get past summary judgment in a civil rights action, a plaintiff needs to 
gather facts and work them into a narrative. For the conclusion that favors 
defendants, however, all one need do is scoff: Not enough. Not numerous 
enough, or bad enough, or unwelcome enough. A big claim might impress me, 
                                                                                                                          
 147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 148. Guido R. Zanni, Many Americans Know Little About Mental Illness, PHARMACY TIMES, Mar. 
1, 2009, available at http://www.pharmacytimes.com/issue/pharmacy/2009/2009-03/2009-03-10058 
(reporting survey data that show how underestimations prevail within public opinion). 
 149. See Anita Bernstein, Lawyers With Disabilities: L’Handicapé C’est Nous, 69 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 389, 394–95 (2008) (observing that messages of welcomeness to persons with disabilities can be 
present or absent in public settings). 
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but this one does not.150 Asymmetry between the parties’ burdens and 
entitlements makes sense in a tort context. Tort plaintiffs routinely fail to 
reach juries when, for example, a defendant’s misbehavior was not “extreme 
and outrageous” enough, or their distress was not “severe,” or they fell short 
of qualifying for a difficult adjective like wanton or reckless.151 Wrongs 
identified only in the common law, which give defendants few explicit rules 
to guide their behavior, call for rigor in the prima facie case. When used to 
obstruct a claim rooted in statutory law, however, de minimis thwarts a 
legislative purpose.152 
The function of the maxim, in the words of one court, “is to place outside 
the scope of legal relief the sorts of intangible injuries normally small and 
invariably difficult to measure that must be accepted as the price of living in 
society rather than made a federal case of.”153 Judges have fashioned de 
minimis barriers to recovery on their own initiative. These barriers lack bases 
in the statutes, and they scoff at real injuries. 
1.  Calling Instances or Episodes “Isolated” 
Litigants who identify a hostile environment―an environment whose 
hostility might include detriments related to their race, sex, disability, age, 
national origin, or another hard-to-modify condition―typically describe 
unpleasant experiences in that environment as having blighted an atmosphere. 
Courts have described the degree of detriment that litigants must show as 
“pervasive.”154 When the atmosphere in question is a workplace, the detriment 
identified must “alter the terms and conditions” of the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                          
 150. Cf. Thomas, supra note 25, at 760–61 (arguing that judges, instead of inquiring whether a 
reasonable jury could accept the plaintiff’s civil rights claim, should ask themselves whether they think 
the evidence is sufficient to reach a jury). 
 151. See generally Alexandra Fiore & Matthew Weinick, Note, Undignified in Defeat: An 
Analysis of the Stagnation and Demise of Proposed Legislation Limiting Video Surveillance in the 
Workplace and Suggestions for Change, 25 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 525, 527 (2008) (noting the 
difficulty of proving tort claims brought to remedy workplace affronts).  
 152. See infra Part III.B.1 (exploring this point in the context for “isolated” instances, a judge-
made device to turn away claims). Citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 777 (1998), which 
had noted in dicta that isolated incidents are not actionable, see id. at 778, courts have referred to 
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Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456, 463 (6th Cir. 2000) (same). 
 153. Swick v. City of Chicago, 11 F.3d 85, 87 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 154. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 
Racial Incidents and Harassment Against Students at Educational Institutions, 59 Fed. Reg. 11448, 
11449 (Mar. 10, 1994) (applying this criterion to racial harassment). For more recent expressions of the 
criterion, see De John v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 316 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting a claim that alleged 
sexual harassment in education); EEOC v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 521 F.3d 306, 315–19 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(concluding that religion-based harassment of a Muslim employee met this standard). 
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employment.155 
If the defendant in a hostile-environment case does not dispute the factual 
particulars of the plaintiff’s account, yet resists the accusation of unlawful 
discrimination, a judge can express agreement with this resistance tersely by 
calling what happened to the plaintiff “isolated.”156 So used, this adjective has 
no precise quantitative meaning. It functions as an antonym of pervasive, but 
whereas judges have given complainants guidance on what the “pervasive” 
criterion demands of them, “isolated” is an arbitrary outcome-summarizing 
conclusion, devoid of substantive content. 
One Title VII sexual harassment decision, Black v. Zaring Homes,157 
illustrates the unprincipled flexibility of “isolated” as a characterization of 
incidents or episodes. Before deciding to file her claim, the plaintiff in Black 
had approached the company’s general counsel inside a women’s restroom. 
The two had just left a meeting replete with coarse sexual humor and 
tauntings, the workplace climate to which the employee had struggled to 
adjust. “I can’t stand [it],” the employee said. “This is crazy. . . . Has it always 
been like this?” “Well, that’s just the way [these co-workers] are,” replied the 
general counsel. “There’s nothing you can do about it.” When the plaintiff 
brought an action against her employer, a magistrate judge referred to one of 
the workplace experiences she deemed harassing as an isolated incident.158 
Judges frequently deem instances of hostile environment sexual 
harassment to be too isolated to warrant relief in the courts. In Quinn v. Green 
Tree Credit Corp.,159 the Second Circuit winnowed out several accusations 
from the plaintiff’s original complaint, found two of them worthy of attention, 
and then concluded that the two acts in question, both of them done by the 
plaintiff’s supervisor’s boss―first, telling the plaintiff “that she had been 
voted the ‘sleekest ass’ in the office” and, second, deliberately touching her 
breasts with papers in his hand―were too “isolated” to have altered her 
conditions of employment.160 Another court totaled the plaintiff’s allegations 
of harassing behaviors by her supervisor and concluded that five acts over 
sixteen months were not numerous enough.161 Eight gender-related comments, 
                                                                                                                          
 155. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 (1998) (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 
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op. at *7 (D.P.R. 2009) (entering summary judgment for defendant because the plaintiff’s allegations of 
race discrimination were “sparse and discrete”). 
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 161. Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997). 
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some of which the Seventh Circuit characterized as “offensive,” were “too 
isolated and sporadic” to warrant relief.162 One defendant won summary 
judgment because the plaintiff “alleged only three relatively isolated incidents 
over a period of approximately two and a half years.”163 Also “relatively 
isolated,” and thus inadequate, were a supervisor’s touching, request for dates, 
and attempted kisses of his subordinate, along with calling her a dumb 
blond.164 
Perhaps there exists a number of offensive incidents so large that no court 
could ever use the adjective “isolated” to describe them. Nevertheless, 
published judicial responses to hostile environment sexual harassment claims 
offer no certainty to would-be litigants that any particular quantity will suffice. 
Instead, the adjective judgment functions to express a conclusion about the 
environment surrounding the plaintiff: Most of this atmosphere was benign 
enough, and if some number of episodes marred that smooth surface, then 
these episodes were too scant and scarce to matter. Courts instruct would-be 
complainants to absorb and accommodate what a song lyric once called “a 
little bit of abuse,”165 without telling them what constitutes a little bit.  
Moving beyond sexual harassment into other civil rights violations, case 
law manifests more judicial rejection through the dismissive use of 
“isolated.”166 When African-American police officers protested “racially 
oriented graffiti in the restrooms,” racial slurs used by high-level officers, and 
a racially offensive cartoon posted on a bulletin board, a trial court deemed 
these experiences “isolated events,” and the Eighth Circuit, with a show of 
reluctance, upheld its conclusion under the indulgent “clearly erroneous” 
standard.167 In another Eighth Circuit decision, an African-American man had 
been “exposed, at most, to six isolated instances of racially derogatory 
language from two managers and three coworkers over the course of a year 
and a half”: too isolated, said the court; not enough to stop summary 
judgment.168 Disability discrimination claims have also been rejected on this 
ground.169 
One appellate decision shows how a court can deploy the word “isolated” 
                                                                                                                          
 162. Patt v. Family Health Sys., 280 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 163. Clark v. United Parcel Serv., 400 F.3d 341, 351 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 164. Weiss v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 165. See THOMAS M. KITTS, RAY DAVIES: NOT LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE 205 (2007) (exploring the 
origins of “A Little Bit of Abuse,” a song by the Kinks that deplored domestic violence). 
 166. But see Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment to Be “Severe or Pervasive” Discriminates Among “Terms and Conditions” of 
Employment, 62 MD. L. REV. 85, 122 (2003) (arguing that although severity and pervasiveness exist as 
nominal criteria for all employment-based harassment claims, in practice they function to impede only 
sexual harassment claims).  
 167. Albert v. Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394–95 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 168. Jackson v. Flint Ink N. Am. Corp., 370 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2004).  
 169. See Bethea v. Potter, 2010 WL 423105, slip op. at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010); Porter v. 
Jackson, 668 F. Supp. 2d 222, 237 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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with the sole result, or perhaps for the sole purpose, of negating an otherwise 
satisfactory complaint of race discrimination. Debra A. Satchel, an African-
American woman who had been terminated from her positions as a Florida 
schoolteacher and school board employee (for “among other things, 
insubordination”) brought an action alleging racial harassment. The Eleventh 
Circuit held that “[t]he harassment Satchel complained of” could not fulfill the 
“pervasive” element of her prima facie case because it “consisted of specific, 
isolated incidents which occurred over a period of years at different 
schools.”170 Remove the conclusory “isolated” from this phrase and it 
becomes a rock-solid description of unlawful actionable conduct. By simple 
ipse dixit, “isolated” withdraws the strength from a strong allegation. 
2.  Saying the Violation Might Have Been Bad, But It 
Was Not That Bad 
Calling incidents or episodes “isolated” deems them too trivial in number; 
a complementary set of dismissals deems misbehaviors too trivial in quality to 
matter. Most notably, starting with Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,171 federal 
courts have used a baseline premise to constrain civil rights liability: Human 
relations necessarily contain some unpleasantness, and in order to be 
actionable, a misbehavior ought to exceed this qualitative norm. Readers of 
employment-discrimination case law know that adjectives like “rude” or 
“boorish”―along with bugbears like the dreaded “civility code,”172 which 
courts seem to assume no worker, employer, or doctrine would ever want―all 
signal to audiences that, once again, a plaintiff has lost because, although what 
happened to him or her at work might have been bad, it was not that bad. 
To the extent that this judicial predilection attempts to bring clarity to 
individuals’ claims of being affronted, it makes good sense. The predilection 
avoids the dangers of an unadministrable subjective standard: Courts should 
not grant relief to a plaintiff based merely on her or his own testimony about 
perceiving hostility in an environment.173 The predilection also recognizes the 
difference between unlawful discrimination and mere offense or discomfort.   
But neither of these benefits―warding off the perils of a subjective 
criterion and clarifying what exactly a plaintiff must prove to prevail―is 
advanced by scoffing at a real injury. A 1998 law review article tersely titled 
De Minimis Discrimination explores how some courts defy the language and 
                                                                                                                          
 170. Satchel v. Sch. Bd., 251 Fed. Appx. 626, 630 (11th Cir. 2007). The four-element prima facie 
case in Satchel is derived from Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 
2002). Satchel, 251 Fed. Appx. at 630.  
 171. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–89 (1998). 
 172. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (emphasizing the need “to 
prevent[] Title VII from expanding into a general civility code”); cf. Bouknight v. District of Columbia, 
2010 WL 145091 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 173. In Part III of this Article, I link the obligation of courts to refrain from trivializing plaintiffs’ 
accounts with the right of defendants not to be held to opaque, unpredictable interpretations of an 
environment that a subjective standard could impose.  
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purposes of Title VII by imposing a judge-made triviality criterion to bar 
claims of disparate treatment.174 Judges have built this barrier out of two 
constructs.  
The first judge-made construct is the “ultimate employment decision” 
requirement, which precludes relief whenever the hurtful experience inflicted 
by the employer on the plaintiff did not consist of “hiring, granting leave, 
discharging, promoting, and compensating,” but instead was something that a 
court could deem “interlocutory or mediate.”175 The other hurdle that judges 
impose is a demand that the plaintiff has suffered a “materially 
adverse”―non-trivial, that is―action at work.176 Neither requirement is found 
in the language of civil rights statutes.177 Both requirements insist that 
plaintiffs meet a severity threshold before courts will consider remedying the 
employment wrongs they suffered.  
Whole categories of workplace injury vanish when the “ultimate” wand 
waves them away. Consider, for example, the African-American worker who 
alleged that the racial composition of a promotion review panel harmed him. 
Postal Service rules had required the presence of at least one woman or 
minority group member on his review panel; the panelists who reviewed the 
plaintiff’s candidacy were all, in violation of the policy, white men.178 The 
Fourth Circuit refused to hear this grievance as a violation of Title VII, 
holding that as an employment action, the composition of the panel was not 
“ultimate” enough.179 In other failed claims, courts held that the retaliatory 
behaviors that plaintiffs suffered were also not ultimate.180 Whether 
employees will suffer detriment from this doctrine depends on the fortuity of 
where in the United States they work: several appellate courts reject the 
“ultimate” criterion for relief.181  
Similarly some, but by no means all, employment discrimination 
complainants face a judge-made barrier that requires “material” adversity in 
an employment action.182 More overtly than the “ultimate” criterion, the 
materiality obstacle insists that de minimis non curat lex. Like the isolated-
incidents peril, this doctrine allows judges to respond, Not enough, I am not 
impressed, without further analysis of the plaintiff’s failure. Adversity falls 
                                                                                                                          
 174. Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L.J. 1121 (1998). 
 175. Id. at 1137 (citing Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 223 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc)). 
 176. Id. at 1143. 
 177. Id. at 1148–50. 
 178. Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 228–29 (4th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
 179. Id. at 233. 
 180. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997) (cataloging instances); 
Ledergeber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff’s disciplinary transfer 
and the letter in her file identifying her as a racist were not “ultimate” employment actions).  
 181. White, supra note 174, at 1140–42 n.85. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
also rejects the “ultimate” criterion. Id. 
 182. Id. at 1146 (noting that the Second, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits reject material adversity as 
an element of the prima facie case). 
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short of material adversity if a judge says it does. Courts have held that 
involuntary lateral transfers,183 negative performance evaluations,184 and the 
reduced opportunities that one notorious plaintiff attributed to her having 
rebuffed a crude sexual overture from then-Governor Bill Clinton185 were all 
too trivial to be heard.  
Hostile-environment sexual harassment case law is replete with egregious 
misbehaviors that courts deemed less than “severe.”186 Courts move nimbly to 
say that sexual harassment as plaintiffs describe it is not really that bad. In 
Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights,187 for example, the Seventh 
Circuit accepted as true the five-year-old plaintiff’s harrowing account of 
grabbing, name calling, taunting, and fondling by a peer―a course of 
mistreatment that caused her psychological injury―and then rejected her 
claim by finding that the kindergarteners described in her complaint “were 
unaware of the sexual nature of their behavior.”188 The Eleventh Circuit 
decided to reframe the Meritor-based severity-or-pervasiveness criterion as a 
four-part conjunctive test, granting summary judgment because the plaintiff 
had failed to show each of the four criteria: frequency, severity, physically 
threatening or humiliating behavior, and unreasonable interference with her 
job performance. 189 In Duncan v. General Motors Corp.,190 the Eighth Circuit 
simply omitted one of the worst incidents in the plaintiff’s narrative when it 
summarized her accusations as not bad enough.191 All of these judicial 
rejections imposed hurdles on plaintiffs found nowhere in the text or history 
of Title VII or any other federal civil rights statute.  
3.  Presuming that the Violation was Welcome  
Antidiscrimination doctrine on welcomeness offers another illustration of 
misplaced de minimis. Like the other dismissive devices noted above, judge-
made rules about welcomeness imply that what a complainant suffered may 
have been no big deal. Welcomeness analysis speculates that a person might 
have once invited behaviors that she later deemed objectionable. A judicial 
                                                                                                                          
 183. Legerderber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1997); Castro v. New York City Bd. of 
Educ., 1998 LEXIS 2863 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1998).  
 184. Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 185. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998). 
 186. Grace S. Ho, Not Quite Rights: How the Unwelcomeness Element in Sexual Harassment Law 
Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential, 20 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 131,152 n.103 (2008) 
(citing Whittaker v. N. Ill. Univ., 424 F.3d 640, 644 (8th Cir. 2005) (approving summary judgment 
where the plaintiff alleged repeated requests for dates from her supervisor, all refused, and repeated uses 
of graphic epithets from him including “stupid cunt” and “fucking lazy bitch”) and Harvill v. Westward 
Commc’ns, 311 F. Supp. 2d 573 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (deeming less than “severe and pervasive” a 
succession of sexual touchings by a co-worker)).  
 187. 315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 188. Id. at 823. 
 189. Mitchell v. Pope, 189 Fed. Appx. 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006); see generally Meritor Sav. 
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1980) (recognizing that sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination 
and requiring that plaintiffs prove severity and pervasiveness when they allege a hostile environment). 
 190. 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 191. Id. at 937 (Arnold, J., dissenting). 
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stance of rejecting complaints on the ground that the conduct in question did 
not, in fact, hurt the claimant does make sense at one level: Civil rights 
plaintiffs alleging injury have an obligation to describe the harm that they 
experienced.192 Without harm, they can receive no redress. 
The judicial response of, “But how do we know you didn’t want the 
conduct you’re now complaining about, back when it happened?”―what I 
refer to here as the unwelcomeness criterion―is, however, crucially different 
from the sensible insistence that anyone who claims injury must have been 
injured. To start, it is used for only one type of civil rights claim. For all 
protected categories except sex, and for all types of offending behavior except 
sexual harassment, disparate-treatment plaintiffs do not have to show that they 
found the complained of behavior unwelcome.193 This doctrinal isolation―not 
written into the statute that the Supreme Court read to impose this extra 
showing―suggests that judges may be accepting or tolerating one type of 
prohibited behavior more than others.  
Installing this element into the prima facie case means that a hostile 
environment sexual harassment plaintiff must not only point to rights-
violating behavior by the defendant; she must also refute a default position 
that she liked (or at a minimum did not mind) a course of conduct that she 
went on to deem violative of her civil rights.194 Making the claim 
exceptionally hard to prove for only hostile-environment sexual harassment 
seems like a lack of interest in redress for this injury. Both the Supreme Court, 
which in 1986 resolved a split in the circuits by declaring unwelcomeness part 
of the prima facie case,195 and the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, which wrote unwelcomeness into its 1980 definition of sexual 
harassment,196 went out of their way to impede this set of civil rights claims. 
For this category, ample impediments to recovery already exist; the 
unwelcomeness criterion is only one of several elements of a prima facie case 
for hostile-environment sexual harassment.197 Adding unwelcomeness 
                                                                                                                          
 192. Cf. supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (noting the ways in which wrongful conduct 
alone does not generate, or warrant, judicial redress). 
 193. Ho, supra note 186, at 139. 
 194. See, e.g., Derrior v. Pinkerton’s, Inc., 1999 WL 311757 (N.D. Ill.) (remarking that “plaintiff 
is not exactly a blushing violet. She admits while on the job she repeatedly used vulgar, profane 
language, told dirty jokes, graphically discussed her sex life and engaged in sexual banter. It would be 
difficult if not impossible to believe that plaintiff would be offended” by sexual conduct). 
 195. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986); Joan S. Weiner, Understanding 
Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Law: Its History and a Proposal for Reform, 72 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 621, 624 n.12 (1997) (noting that although most federal appellate courts pre-Meritor had required 
plaintiffs to show unwelcomeness, the Third and Ninth Circuits had not). 
 196. The EEOC placed “unwelcomeness” in a definition. See EEOC Guidelines on 
Discrimination Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74, 676 (No. 10, 1980) (calling workplace sexual 
harassment “unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature”). This drafting contains some ambiguity, but it seems to use “unwelcome” to 
modify the entire list.  
 197. A plaintiff must also establish that the behavior complained of was based on sex, that it 
affected a term or condition of employment, and that the defendant-employer knew or should have 
known of the behavior and failed to remedy it. This version of the the prima facie case, accepted by the 
Supreme Court in Meritor, was first stated in Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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presumes that a plaintiff who can show all of these other elements 
nevertheless presumptively welcomed the conduct in question. The criterion 
introduces “a troublesome line of reasoning: Since women generally welcome 
sexual behavior, it is most efficient to require the exceptional woman who 
does not welcome such behavior to make her difference known.”198 
This objection is not new; commentators have opposed the unwelcomeness 
criterion. Some advocate its elimination while others favor reducing its 
burdens on plaintiffs.199 For the broken windows thesis of this Article, what is 
noteworthy about requiring evidence of unwelcomeness is not its 
wrongheaded policy stance but how it continues a tradition of judicial disdain 
in civil rights litigation. Both judges and scholars who have written about 
unwelcomeness in sexual harassment doctrine have commented on its unique 
and exceptional status.200 Agreeing that sexual harassment does indeed differ 
from other civil rights claims in this respect, I would make a separate point 
about its similarity.  
Judicial responses to civil rights claims that fault plaintiffs for not having 
enough episodes to recount, or not having suffered enough, are instances of 
the same judicial bent toward de minimis condemnation of unambiguous (and 
often undenied) wrongdoing.201 Telling these employment discrimination 
plaintiffs that it is not enough for them to show that they 1) are members of a 
protected class; 2) suffered adversity based on their membership in that class; 
and 3) worked for an employer that knew or should have known about 
oppressive conditions yet unreasonably failed to remedy them―that this much 
of a showing is not enough, because a now-aggrieved employee might once 
have welcomed these conditions she describes as injurious―is only the most 
extreme judicial trivialization in use, not the only one: it resembles other ways 
courts tell plaintiffs that they have not endured enough abuse. Courts could 
not have invented the welcomeness criterion without their extensive prior 
experience in disparaging and minimizing violations of civil rights. “How do 
we know you did not like the disparate treatment about which you are 
complaining?” takes only a small step beyond calling accounts of injury 
“isolated” without defining the term or deciding that a person’s injury must go 
unremedied because it was not severe enough. 
Although the unwelcomeness criterion appears to ask a yes-no 
question―Did you want it, or did you not want it?―in function it takes a 
qualitative, gradable measure of a claim, resembling the other two judicial 
responses that seek to reserve recourse for only the worst harms. Like deeming 
                                                                                                                          
 198. Ho, supra note 186, at 133. Ho also argues that later sexual harassment decisions by the 
Supreme Court bolstered the unwelcomeness criterion as a way to make plaintiffs lose and defendants 
win. See id. at 144–45 (discussing affirmative defenses as announced in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998)). 
 199. See id. at 133–34 (summarizing academic proposals for reform, which include abolishing the 
requirement, shifting the burden of proof to defendants, and restricting it to an evidentiary doctrine with 
respect to damages). 
 200. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68 (deeming unwelcomeness to be “the gravamen” of the entire cause of 
action); Henry L. Chambers, Jr., (Un)Welcome Conduct and the Sexually Hostile Environment, 53 ALA. 
L. REV. 733, 781 & n.221 (2002) (reviewing scholarly commentary). 
 201. See supra Part II.B.1–2. 
930 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
incidents too few and deeming them too mild, the criterion brings a de 
minimis approach to this particular civil rights violation. One commentator, 
Grace S. Ho, makes this point by recounting her interviews with litigators 
working in this field. Having talked to lawyers who represent plaintiffs, 
defendants, and the EEOC, Ho found that the unwelcomeness criterion has in 
practice post-Meritor moved from the prima facie case to an affirmative 
defense for institutional employers.202 Although the plaintiffs’ lawyers Ho 
surveyed believed that ideally they would know, pre-filing, about any 
contemporaneous protests that had indicated unwelcomeness, they recounted 
focusing more on whether the plaintiff had reported the conduct to her 
employer. They explained that they ask the did-you-report question to evaluate 
the strength of a prospective case.203  
This particular inclination to sort on gradable terms―that is, to separate 
weak from strong, bad from good, not unwelcome from not welcome―has 
little to do with the statute or the substantive merits of a claim. Every one of 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers that Ho surveyed, as well as some of the EEOC 
lawyers, “expressed pragmatic concerns regarding the difficulties of using the 
employer’s complaint mechanisms.”204 In other words, these lawyer-
informants believed that requiring harassed workers to have articulated a clear 
protest is a bad policy if one wishes to know whether harassment really 
happened. It is perverse for courts to suppose that disparate-impact affronts 
were welcome whenever an employee did not complain about them formally. 
Again, one finds a de minimis filter at work, at least in the large fraction of 
cases that include claims against institutional employers. The unwelcomeness 
criterion functions to demand an extra bad, extra severe, or extra large 
injury.205 
C.  Relocating Broken Windows to Civil Rights Liability: Some Benefits  
A broken windows approach to civil rights claims would undo the judge-
made doctrines that demand extra largeness from plaintiffs.206 Judges applying 
broken windows to civil rights violations would recognize that even small 
infringements “create an environment that breeds bigger” offenses.207 Many, 
                                                                                                                          
 202. Ho, supra note 186, at 150. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. 
 205. A racial harassment case illustrates this judicial maneuver. One district court judge, rejecting 
a claim, held that the racial harassment that plaintiff alleged was not “‘extremely serious’ as Title VII 
requires.” Porter v. Milliken & Michaels, Inc., No. 99-0199, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9157, at *20 (E.D. 
La. June 27, 2001). Title VII does not contain the phrase “extremely serious.” Neither does Faragher, 
the Supreme Court decision the court cited immediately after the phrase quoted. Id. (citing Faragher v. 
City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). The court, in effect, added another layer of burden onto 
a moderate demand as articulated by the Supreme Court. The pattern is prevalent. See generally Keller 
& Tracy, supra note 21 (arguing that lower courts regularly augment the Supreme Court’s demands on 
plaintiffs who file discrimination actions).  
 206. See supra Part I.  
 207. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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although not all, of these affronts warrant redress, for the same broken 
windows reasons that police officers respond to misdemeanors. Three 
conditions make broken windows policies more desirable in the civil rights 
liability context than for police work. First, assigning the role of initiator to 
private citizens rather than state actors mitigates abuses. Second, because civil 
rights claims derive from democratically enacted statutes―whereas broken 
windows policing rests on police discretion that permits caprice―a civil rights 
application is more congruent with the rule of law. Third, to the extent an 
instance of broken windows enforcement might be misplaced or unjust, it 
faces a fairer fight in civil rights litigation than it does in street policing: Civil 
rights defendants who are burdened by a policy of hostility to their affronts 
have money and power that almost every broken windows street target lacks.  
1.  Public Gain Through Private Initiative 
The civil rights application proposed in this Article assigns enforcement to 
injured individuals. Government entities like the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission have the authority to initiate civil rights enforcement 
actions, but  they will not do so for the smaller affronts that occupy us. In this 
particular context of de minimis curet lex―that is, when civil rights are at 
stake, the law should concern itself with small things―the state plays the role 
of adjudicator, not jackboot initiator. 208 
Relocating the broken windows hypothesis to citizen-initiated claims about 
civil rights removes the Foucauldian shadow that hovers atop the law 
enforcement application.209 Established as a first mover, the injured person 
acts as as an agent and instigator. As a group of initiators, these people 
connect broken windows with vulnerability rather than surveillance and 
punishment.  
They bring restraint to a metaphor long associated with authoritarian 
arrogance.210 Whenever an armed front-line constabulary carries out a law 
enforcement policy, it uses force. Its force is checked and tempered, to be 
sure. Higher ups in police departments, external entities like civilian 
complaint boards, and courts authorized to hear complaints of brutality or 
other misconduct can review the conduct of officers.211 Most law enforcement 
excesses, however, will escape scrutiny and sanction. Especially when it 
focuses on stopping poor and disempowered offenders, broken windows 
policing can inflict injuries that do not easily come to light through 
                                                                                                                          
 208. Here, I presume that agencies like the EEOC will continue to devote its enforcement energies 
to large-scale offenses. If this stance should change, and government entities decide that de minimis 
curet lex, then defendants will still enjoy much more power to withstand the enforcement effort than 
street-policing broken-windows defendants now hold. 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 55–56. 
 210. See supra Part I. 
 211. SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 171–73 (2005) 
(summarizing twentieth-century reforms). 
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complaints. 
This point emerges from contrasting civil adjudication, initiated by 
individuals, with criminal prosecution, which has been a governmental 
monopoly since the 19th century.212 Stephen Yeazell has invited readers to 
recall the 19th-century practice of citizen-initiated criminal prosecution, where 
aggrieved individuals could hale offenders into the criminal courts for judicial 
punishment.213 His imaginative exercise widens the arc of “access to justice” 
commonly (and narrowly) understood as access to the civil courts. Because 
many offenders lack assets to pay a civil judgment, access to courts for civil 
recourse means little to many potential plaintiffs.214 “Poor people want more 
policing,”215 writes Yeazell. Restoring their old prerogative to threaten 
offenders with jail time would give the poor real protection from such class-
related harms as unlawful evictions and predatory lending.216 
That poor people want more policing has a ready analogy in civil rights 
liability: People whose civil rights are covered by antidiscrimination 
legislation want more enforcement of these rights. The analogy is indeed 
stronger than Yeazell’s point, because whereas the poor might have reasons to 
mistrust police officers, individuals whose group-based traits are protected by 
antidiscrimination legislation have no cause to mistrust courts empowered to 
apply laws written to enhance the quality of their lives. Their role as initiators 
reduces the danger that ostensible protection will be twisted to hurt them. 
Accordingly, in an extension of the idea Yeazell has broached―returning to 
crime victims their old prerogative to initiate a criminal prosecution of a 
person who violated the criminal law and hurt them thereby217―one may 
more narrowly infer that victims of civil rights violations should gain an easier 
passage to the courts. 
Shifting broken windows enforcement power to citizens enjoys ample 
support in American law and policy. Fee shifting, qui tam, and the notion of a 
private attorney general, among other doctrines, all express overt confidence 
in private initiative as a source of public gain.218 Unlawful discrimination 
becomes manifest in a feedback relation: Legislators who proscribe categories 
of injurious behavior depend on the information that emerges from civil rights 
claims, and individuals learn from legislation and adjudication about wrongs 
                                                                                                                          
 212. Stephen C. Yeazell, Socializing Law, Privatizing Law, Monopolizing Law, Accessing Law, 
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 213. Id. at 692. 
 214. Id. at 695. 
 215. Id. at 697 (citations omitted). 
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that they are entitled to protest.219 For this dialectic to flourish, every civil 
court must remain at least somewhat open to protests from aggrieved 
individuals. Complainants provide facts and experiences that alter the content 
of civil rights, a category of law under continual reassessment.  
2.  The Statutory Warrant: More Orderly Order 
Judges who honor the nondiscrimination objectives that Congress wrote 
into civil rights law help to carry out a democratically derived mandate. Rights 
to equal treatment in such venues as employment, housing, and education 
occupy Great Society-era legislation, and  have only grown since then via 
expansive amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and newer statutes that 
recognize other protected categories.220 Civil rights protections enjoy a broad 
base of civic support and an even broader base of familiarity. Only a 
dwindling number of people alive today in the United States can remember a 
time when laws like these were not on the books.221 Laws enacted at the state 
level underscore this consensus and enhance the democratic provenance of the 
protections.222 
Recall the definition of civil rights law with which this Article began: 
“[T]he right to share equally with other citizens in such benefits as jobs, 
housing, education, and public accommodations.”223 The broken windows 
perspective on civil rights law regards civil rights violations as important in 
part because legislatures, notably Congress, have said so. Their expressions 
provide a statutory warrant for citizen initiative and judicial response. 
                                                                                                                          
 219. Michael W. McCann, Law and Political Struggles for Social Change: Puzzles, Paradoxes, 
and Promises in Future Research, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL 
CHANGE 319, 328 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998). 
 220. Gillian K. Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil Litigation: 
Differences Between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1289–90 (2005) (noting expansions of federal statutory civil rights liability in 
the late 20th century). 
 221. One American college makes this point humorously every August by publishing a list of 
what students about to start their higher education take for granted. The publication serves to remind 
administrators, instructors, and parents how old they have grown. For example, the 2009 version  
includes “With little need to practice, most of them do not know how to tie a tie,” “Condoms have 
always been advertised on television,” “They may have fallen asleep playing with their Gameboys in the 
crib,” “They missed the oat bran dieting craze,” and “Lyme disease has always been a ticking concern in 
the woods.” See Beloit College Mindset List for the Class of 2009, www.beloit.edu/mindset/2009.php 
(last visited Apr. 13, 2010). Statutory civil rights had been venerable for a long time when Gameboys 
and the oat-bran fad came along. 
 222. For a rueful comment on the dispensability of this principle when it becomes inexpedient, 
see Melissa McEwan, Mourning Gay Marriage in Maine, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 4, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/ 2009/nov/04/gay-marriage-maine-ballot-initiative 
(“And so came the howling about ‘activist judges’. But in Maine, it was not left to a judge to decide the 
fate of same-sex marriage, but instead to the state legislature. And then―what a surprise―that wasn’t 
good enough, either. It still had to be brought before Maine’s voters . . . .”). 
 223. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
934 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
Insisting that violations of these rights will be remedied even if they are 
not large honors an unambiguous directive from statute-writing lawmakers. 
When civil rights legislation provides a private right of action, it recognizes 
not only a social ill but the necessity of enlisting individuals to bring claims 
for redress. Private rights of action in contemporary civil rights law were 
either written into the statutes or accepted by the legislature after judges 
declared this right, thereby manifesting a democratic provenance.224 
Here, we may quickly review a few ideals of what makes democratically 
enacted legislation worthy of esteem. Civil rights laws were passed by elected 
representatives of the American people. Legislators voted openly: the public 
had a chance to express its approval or disapproval of provisions. Majorities 
prevailed. Coverage of the lawmaking process by journalists and other 
observers publicized the goals and content of various laws before they reached 
a vote. Judicial review has for centuries empowered judges to strike down 
enactments that are contrary to law. The passage of civil rights legislation in 
the United States has exemplified ideals of democracy, fairness, and progress 
as well as any other instance of enacted statutory law in this country. What I 
am calling a statutory warrant―the rightness of using majority-voted law as 
an instrument of progress―supports the broken windows policy that this 
Article advocates.  
Law enforcement on the street, rooted only in a charge to watch over 
discrete geographic regions, lacks this overt invitation in the law. And 
whereas civil rights legislation deserves esteem even before it is used, simply 
in recognition of its democratic bona fides, police discretion deserves esteem 
only when individual officers use it well. The essential work of these officers 
can include abuses.225 A broken windows law enforcement policy has no 
inherent link to such baleful inclinations, but it also contains no safeguards 
against them. Accordingly, the civil rights application of broken windows 
enforcement relocates the technique to a place with a stronger foundation in 
the rule of law. 
                                                                                                                          
 224. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2006) (codifying a private right of action for Title VII 
employment discrimination), with Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (finding a private 
right of action, not codified by Congress, in Title IX). 
 225. For example, one critic of broken windows recently wrote about a New York police practice 
of contriving broken windows misdemeanors by stopping persons on the street and asking them to 
empty their pockets. If this pocket emptying reveals marijuana, the officer can arrest the individual for 
publicly displaying this drug; mere possession of marijuana without displaying it is not an arrestable 
offense.  Balko, supra note 78.  See also Samuel Walker & Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy 
for Police Misconduct: A Model State “Pattern or Practice” Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 
479, 488 (2009) (summarizing practices that include searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
coerced confessions that violate the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, mistreatment of suspects in 
confinement, race discrimination in decisions to detain individuals, police brutality, and corrupt 
inattention to particular violations of the law). 
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3.  A Fairer Fight 
Objections to broken windows law enforcement have come mainly from 
social scientists, other scholarly writers, and community activists rather than 
persons vulnerable to police harassment. No one on the street defends a 
broken window.  Among those persons who have denounced broken windows 
as policy, few report anything about how an individual arrested, detained, 
questioned, or otherwise put at the receiving end of broken windows has 
experienced this approach to law enforcement. The policy’s small scale―the 
petty blights, its misdemeanors rather than felonies, the police officers who irk 
street offenders rather than mistreat them gravely―means that protests from 
affected individuals stay small as well. All persons impacted by broken 
windows know their peripheral status. They remain marginalized. 
Formal allegations of civil rights wrongs, by contrast, are aimed at people 
and entities that think of themselves as respectable. Cast as defendants, these 
entities and persons typically insist they have done nothing wrong. Their 
respectability makes the struggle fairer. Rather than vex petty street offenders 
and the hapless poor, the civil rights application advocated here applies law 
enforcement against persons and organizations that have money and power.   
The persistence of a civil rights claim against an entity defendant suggests 
that something important is at stake: the defendant either has taken a stance of 
resistance to complaints generally or is refusing to admit wrongdoing with 
respect to the plaintiff’s particulars. Either way, the accusation matters. 
Perhaps the plaintiff should lose. He may not be entitled to a day in court. But 
judicial labeling of the matter as unworthy because it is too small stands 
refuted by the power of the defendant to dispatch the accusation. If it is really 
so undeserving of attention, one might wonder why the defendant did not 
spend a pittance to make it go away.226 Defendants in civil rights litigation not 
only have good access to lawyers to tell their side of the story; most of them 
are prosperous.  
Impecunious persons certainly can violate the civil rights laws―one thinks 
of a low-income landlord turning away prospective tenants based on their 
race, unemployed louts who form packs and commit violent hate crimes, a 
struggling entrepreneur who exploits undocumented workers―but as a 
general rule, victims will file actions for financial redress only when the 
accused appears capable of paying a judgment.227 Thus aided by counsel, civil 
rights defendants are well positioned to disparage small injuries as unworthy 
                                                                                                                          
 226. Lest readers infer that I have never seen a civil rights claim I didn’t like, two clarifications. 
First, a defendant that declines to settle a claim it deems unfounded may well be hewing to principle. A 
principled refusal to settle is, however, inconsistent with the stance of deeming a claim too trivial to 
deserve attention. See supra Part II.B. Second, my implicit endorsement of spending a pittance to make 
a claim go away applies to allegations of relatively small yet real injury rather than to frivolous or bad-
faith claims, which in my view should continue to receive the judicial disapproval (and sanctions) that 
they now encounter. I thank Diane Fahey for pressing me on this point. 
 227. Yeazell, supra note 212, at 695. 
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of judicial redress even if a judge takes away the de minimis weapon these 
defendants have habitually wielded. Civil rights defendants can also pay or 
pressure a plaintiff to withdraw an accusation. These docket-clearing devices, 
made out of money, permit courts to preserve scarce time on their calendars. 
Judges can do their jobs without the barrier of this dismissive device. 
Consider the contrasts of applying broken windows to street enforcement. 
Broken windows misdemeanor arrests typically will not meet Sixth 
Amendment criteria for court-appointed counsel,228 and most arrested persons 
will lack funds of their own to pay attorneys’ fees. Affected individuals will 
receive attorney talent powerful enough to resist a broken windows policy 
sufficient to articulate their view of broken windows law enforcement only if 
a civil rights organization decides to invest in impact litigation or a similar 
high visibility strategy to oppose a police policy. Impact litigation of this kind 
was rare even back in the heyday of activist lawyering and is rarer today.229 
Whatever else may obstruct a broken windows approach to street disorder, 
then, meaningful resistance by affected individuals is not among the barriers. 
The struggle between enforcers and the enforced-upon in this respect recalls 
the invasion decades ago by U.S. armed forces of an island country whose 
population barely exceeded 100,000. Grenada may have deserved to be 
invaded, but the 1983 skirmish that the bigger country started was surely an 
asymmetrical one. This Grenada-like absence of a fair fight―“a fair fight” 
meaning a dispute where the non-initiator has sufficient power to assert its 
interests―makes broken windows presumptively more troubling in the street 
enforcement context than it would be against well-heeled civil rights 
defendants. 
Continuing the money-and-power theme, a civil rights application of the 
broken windows strategy makes the fight of private-law civil rights 
enforcement even fairer through statutory fee shifting. Fee shifting permits the 
awarding of attorney’s fees in civil rights cases to prevailing parties, contrary 
to the default “American rule” that requires both sides to pay for their own 
lawyers in most other categories of civil litigation.230 These statutes encourage 
enforcement actions that would otherwise never reach the courts. In these 
enforcement actions, accused persons and entities receive power through their 
advantaged circumstances before filing, and plaintiffs receive power through 
                                                                                                                          
 228. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (holding that “actual imprisonment” as a threat 
must be present before a defendant has a right to counsel). 
 229. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and 
Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 947–48 (2007) (describing a retreat from impact 
litigation by civil rights activists). 
 230. The federal fee shifting statute that governs civil rights actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006), 
was enacted “to make sure that competent counsel was available to civil rights plaintiffs . . . .” 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 93–94 (1989). See generally Krent, supra note 218 (defending 
one-way fee shifting). For more on the default American rule, see David A. Root, Note, Attorney Fee-
Shifting in America: Comparing, Contrasting, and Combining the “American Rule” and “English 
Rule,” 15 IND. J. COMP. & INT’L L. 583, 584–89 (2005). 
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the prospect of shifted fees should they prevail. Both sides get to tell their own 
broken windows story of what happened, contrary to the street-enforcement 
version of broken windows that rounds up disorderly offenders and gives them 
no voice. 
Because an application of this Article’s proposed new maxim, de minimis 
curet lex, to civil rights claims would probably have the effect of reducing 
summary disposition and thus expanding the number of complaints that could 
reach a jury, the civil jury also warrants attention in this discussion of a fair 
fight. Civil liability defendants have for decades decried what they perceive as 
juries’ prejudice against them, along with the uncertainty that jury 
adjudication adds to their business planning.231 Their protests 
notwithstanding, the presence of a jury―whether actually empaneled or just a 
specter that influences settlement negotiations―adds to the fairness of a civil 
rights fight. 
According to one expert on the civil jury, this group of individuals applies 
“commonsense justice” to civil claims.232 The civil jury seeks balance as it 
evaluates the behaviors and obligations of plaintiffs and defendants.233 Judges, 
defense lawyers, plaintiffs’ lawyers, and jurors themselves have all expressed 
praise for the intelligence, good faith, and fairness of jurors.234 
To be sure, the civil jury has provoked plenty of skepticism and distaste 
over the years, not only from plutocrats who fear its homespun wisdom.235 
One need not be a Tocquevillian cheerleader to accept the value of juries for 
this civil rights application. Jury trials offer litigants and onlookers a solemn 
hearing, a civic ritual, and a didactic takeaway. They also temper the power of 
the government: as a judicial defender of the civil jury has pointed 
                                                                                                                          
 231. For expressions of these discontents, see Richard M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting 
Conciliation Back into the Process: The Peacemaking Approach to Resolution, Peace and Healing, 54 
DRAKE L. REV. 259, 262–63 (2006); Michael Z. Green, Measures to Encourage and Reward Post-
Dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Discrimination Claims, 8 NEV. L.J. 58, 67 (2007) (noting 
that employment defendants mistrust jury decisionmaking); see also Mary J. Davis, The Battle over 
Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 1127 (2007) (noting 
concerns about unpredictability in debates about products liability). 
 232. Valerie P. Hans, Juries as Conduits for Culture?, in FAULT LINES: TORT LAW AS CULTURAL 
PRACTICE 80, 89–92 (David M. Engel & Michael McCann eds., 2009). 
 233. See id. (citing NEAL FEIGENSON, LEGAL BLAME: HOW JURORS THINK AND TALK ABOUT 
ACCIDENTS 16–18 (2000)). 
 234. Peter H. Schuck, Judicial Avoidance of Juries in Mass Tort Litigation, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 
479, 479–81 (1998); see also supra note 27 (citing law review articles by federal judges that lament the 
vanishing trial). 
 235. See MARK TWAIN, ROUGHING IT 341–42 (Oxford Univ. Pres 1996) (1872) (disparaging the 
intelligence and probity of the American jury); Schuck, supra note 234, at 479–82 (noting that although 
all sectors of the civil justice system praise juries, they also manifest a contrary preference for 
settlement); Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1707, 1735–36 (1996) (reviewing WILLI AM JOHN CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND 
ORIGINAL MEANING (1990)) (reporting Noah Webster’s 19th-century question: “But, why this outcry 
about juries? If the people esteem them so highly, why do they ever neglect them, and suffer the trial by 
them to go into disuse?”). 
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out―tellingly for this Article’s contrast with broken windows street 
policing―juries “provide a vital buffer” between litigants and power-holders 
in the judicial, legislative, and executive branches, all of whom repose on 
government payrolls.236 
To sum up: The civil rights application of broken windows gives 
defendants conspicuously more power than their street-side counterparts to 
withstand the rigors of what they will face when accused. Civil rights 
defendants can hire good lawyers, settle disputes with cash, and oppose the 
accusation with forensics. At a macro level, should this Article’s 
recommendation be heeded and courts become more welcoming of small-
scale civil rights complaints, the sectors affected would have ample 
opportunity to articulate their reactions to the policy.237 
III.  HOW TO FILTER CLAIMS WITHOUT TRIVIALIZING REAL CIVIL 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
We now consider how courts might apply the broken windows approach to 
civil rights litigation. A judge might deem the possibility plausible yet at the 
same time find simple good sense in the medieval de minimis non curat lex. 
Maxims or no maxims, the number of hours in a day remains twenty-four; all 
time spent on a small case is time unspent on something else.  
Courts need analytic criteria to sort undeserving from deserving 
contentions. This Part offers boundary-fostering devices that permit 
defendants to prevail for better reasons than de minimis scoffing at the real, 
rights-violating harm that an injured person has alleged. I start by reviewing 
judge-made demands on claimants that the broken windows thesis of the 
Article would remove, and then discuss barriers against civil rights claims that 
ought to remain in place. 
A.  To Be Discarded: Judicial Devices that Use De Minimis 
Reasoning to Reject Civil Rights Claims 
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,238 the Supreme Court unanimously 
reversed one of the countless lower court decisions that had rejected a 
plaintiff’s civil rights complaint as too trivial to remedy.239 The opinion for 
the Court declared the Harris task as “to resolve a conflict among the Circuits 
on whether conduct, to be actionable as ‘abusive work environment’ 
                                                                                                                          
 236. Sparks & Butts, supra note 27, at 313. 
 237. These defendants might install new human resources systems to resolve low-level 
discrimination complaints at work. They might present a principled defense of de minimis in civil rights 
doctrine that to date has not emerged because judges have granted defendants this favor on their own. 
Or they might gather empirical evidence, again potentially available but never demanded, to show that 
small complaints are indeed not worth judicial time. 
 238. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 239. Id. at 19–20 (noting that the lower court had found the abusive behaviors not severe 
enough). 
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harassment . . . must ‘seriously affect [an employee’s] psychological well-
being’ or lead the plaintiff to ‘suffe[r] injury.’”240 The answer is no, held the 
Court. “So long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is 
perceived, as hostile or abusive . . . there is no need for it also to be 
psychologically injurious.”241 De minimis curet lex, in effect. 
Justice Scalia, writing separately, worried about relatively trivial affronts 
that could win redress from “virtually unguided juries,” whom the Court left 
free to “decide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an 
employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages.”242 
Nevertheless, Scalia joined the majority opinion. The text of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, he wrote, compelled his vote:  
Be that as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court 
today has taken. One of the factors mentioned in the Court’s 
nonexhaustive list—whether the conduct unreasonably interferes 
with an employee’s work performance—would, if it were made 
an absolute test, provide greater guidance to juries and 
employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation in the 
language of the statute.243 
The Scalia concurrence in Harris reminds judges and observers that lower 
courts have no prerogative to make up their own restrictions that keep 
statutory civil rights claims out of court. They have done so nonetheless. With 
only one exception, as noted below, their improvisations stray from binding 
Supreme Court precedent.244 
1.  Deeming Rights-Violating Incidents “Isolated” 
The adjective “isolated” has no place in summary disposition of a civil 
rights claim. No statute establishes isolatedness as a condition warranting 
judicial rejection. No definition of the word is available to inform individuals 
or entities about the bounds of acceptable conduct. Because courts agree that 
even one affront, if egregious, can suffice for a civil rights claim,245 any 
                                                                                                                          
 240. Id. at 20. 
 241. Id. at 22. 
 242. Id. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 243. Id. at 24–25. 
 244. For additional detail, see supra Part II.B (presenting these erroneous doctrines as federal 
courts now employ them). 
 245. Little v. Windermere Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A single 
‘incident’ of harassment―and we assume arguendo that three rapes in the course of one evening 
constitutes a ‘single’ incident―can support a claim of hostile work environment . . . .”); Rodgers v. 
Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Perhaps no single act can more 
quickly ‘alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment’ . . . than the 
use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as ‘nigger’ by a supervisor in the presence of his 
subordinates.”); Gnerre v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 524 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Mass. 1988) 
(holding that one incident of sexual harassment suffices to establish sex discrimination in housing). 
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number of incidents greater than zero could exceed the designation of 
“isolated”; at the other extreme, courts have tallied no number of incidents 
that, as a matter of law, is always too large to be deemed isolated.246 Juries, 
parties, and prospective litigants thus gain no guidance from the word.247 It 
should be expunged from civil rights jurisprudence. 
2.  Requiring Both Severity and Pervasiveness  
The Meritor-derived elements of “severe” and “pervasive” derive from an 
Eleventh Circuit decision, Henson v. City of Dundee, on which the Supreme 
Court relied when it recognized hostile-environment sexual harassment as a 
violation of Title VII. In Meritor, the Court used the severity and 
pervasiveness elements with considerable care.248 First, the Court changed 
“severe and persistent,” the conjunctive Henson locution, to the disjunctive 
“severe or pervasive.”249 By allowing either adjective to suffice, in place of 
requiring both, the Court moved toward making environment-related civil 
rights claims more welcome. 
The Supreme Court has implicitly warned that using the two adjectives too 
strictly would bar hostile environment claims that ought to receive a hearing.   
The Harris definition of hostile or abusive environment as one “that a 
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive,”250 written seven years after 
Meritor, can be read as recognition that a “severe or pervasive” criterion 
demands too much from civil rights plaintiffs.251 Undoubtedly “severe or 
pervasive” is here to stay until the Supreme Court revisits the phrase or 
Congress amends the statutes. Misinterpreting the criterion as conjunctive, 
however, thwarts claims to a degree that civil rights law unambiguously 
forbids.252 Severity (i.e., a term that might be understood as magnitude, 
heinousness, or reprehensibility) or pervasiveness (i.e., rights-violating 
conduct that sweeps through the geography of the environment in question) 
alone will suffice.  
3.  Requiring an “Ultimate” Employment Action  
The ultimate-or-not inquiry applies to discrete instances of discrimination 
rather than the wide ranging swath of harms that make an environment hostile 
or abusive. Using “ultimate” as a barrier reminds observers of civil rights 
litigation that de minimis scorn of claims extends beyond disparaging claims 
                                                                                                                          
 246. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 247. See supra note 243 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Scalia on the importance of 
making employment-discrimination criteria intelligible “to juries and employers”). 
 248. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982); Meritor Sav. Bank v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 249. Johnson, supra note 166, at 96 (emphasis added). 
 250. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
 251. See Johnson, supra note 166, at 85–86. 
 252. See supra notes 21, 186–89 and accompanying text. 
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of sexual or racial harassment―categories that too often draw a judgment of 
“isolated” or not sufficiently severe or pervasive. Courts have rejected claims 
as insufficiently “ultimate” when litigants have complained under § 703(a)(1) 
of the Civil Rights Act, which codifies the ban on disparate treatment and 
requires an adverse employment action.253 Like invoking “isolated” to bar 
complaints, this judicial use of “ultimate” declares a de minimis barrier to 
recovery that has no foundation in a statute. 
Plaintiffs who bring disparate treatment claims under Title VII face a clear 
statutory statement of the elements they must prove and which injuries will 
suffice for redress. It is an “unlawful employment practice” for an employer 
“to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”254 The statute includes no 
provision that the employer’s discriminating conduct must take some ultimate 
form. Courts thus have no power to reject a claim of discrimination by 
asserting that what the plaintiff complains of is merely “interlocutory or 
mediate.”255 That the plaintiff has complained establishes that the injury is 
ripe enough: any claim may deserve to fail, but readiness emerges from the 
filing itself.256 Unlike refusals to grant interlocutory relief in litigation, this 
judicial rejection maneuver offers none of the administrative advantages 
associated with finality,257 other than a bald (and unprincipled) reduction in 
litigation volume. Courts should abandon it. 
4.  Requiring Materiality  
Like the use of “ultimate” as a barrier, the materiality element that some 
courts have improvised258 has no basis in civil rights statutes that do not use 
the term and is refuted by the fact of a complaint. The plaintiff cared enough 
to bring a civil action for redress; the defendant cared enough to resist the 
                                                                                                                          
 253. See White, supra note 174, at 1148–50. 
 254. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 255. See Page v. Bolger, 645 F.2d 227, 233 (4th Cir. 1981).  
 256. The “ultimate” criterion is unobjectionable when courts use it to deny relief when an 
employer reversed its discriminatory action. In such cases, one may say that ultimately the defendant did 
the right thing, and its pre-correction wrongful behaviors, having been cured, amount to no actionable 
civil rights violation. For discussions of the “ultimate” criterion in this context, see Taylor v. Small, 350 
F.3d 1286, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (noting that plaintiff’s supervisor had “corrected her error” before the 
plaintiff filed her action) and Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting 
that the plaintiff had “received the promotion with retroactive pay and seniority”). 
 257. One commentator notes that refusing interlocutory challenges in the federal courts offers at 
least four advantages: the efficiency of a single appeal rather than “several appeals that require separate 
briefs, records, oral arguments and opinions,” esteem for the appellate court’s “broader perspective,” 
worries about disrespecting “the authority of the trial judge,” and the virtues of swiftness and 
predictability. David Scheffel, Note and Comment, Interlocutory Appeals in New York—Time Has 
Come for a More Efficient Approach, 16 PACE L. REV. 607, 620 (1996). 
 258. See supra notes 182–85 and accompanying text. 
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accusation.259 Big enough, in short. Materiality is easy for legislators to write 
into a statute; the absence of “material” as a modifier tells courts not to add it 
to the burdens of a civil litigant.260 
5. Presuming Welcomeness 
An individual might welcome adverse disparate treatment, similar to the 
way sexual markets supply extraordinary humiliation and physical pain to the 
willing. But perversity is inherently less probable than conventional desires or 
responses. Scholarly commentary agrees that courts applying the 
preponderance standard in civil litigation should not presume that a plaintiff 
reacted to discriminatory conditions by welcoming them.261 In recommending 
that courts excise unwelcomeness from the plaintiff’s prima facie case, I differ 
with current Supreme Court precedent but join a virtually unanimous chorus 
of academic writing.262  
In this context of writing doctrine, of course, what is more important than 
any consensus among scholars is what judges do. Some judges have agreed 
that claimants should not have to overcome a default stance that a victim of 
discrimination wanted to be discriminated against.263 Judicial erosion of the 
Meritor demand should continue, and scholarship can aid this progress. More 
judges will choose to reject the unwelcomeness criterion when they hear 
echoes of the “She must have been asking for it” and “Why didn’t she leave?” 
                                                                                                                          
 259. See supra text accompanying note 256. 
 260. A different approach applies in federal criminal law, for which the Supreme Court has issued 
guidance to lower courts. Reading a materiality requirement into a statute that does not codify this 
demand can be correct when the liberty of a criminal defendant is at stake. See James B. Helmer, Jr. & 
Julie Webster Popham, Materiality and the False Claims Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 840–43 (2003) 
(describing the Court’s decisions on materiality as a condition for False Claims Act prosecutions). The 
requirement lacks this justification when improvised as a bar to civil rights complaints. 
 261. See, e.g., Miranda Oshige, Note, What’s Sex Got to Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 579 
(1995). 
 262. See Chambers, supra note 200, at 786; Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 
825–26 (1991); Hébert, supra note 28, at 578; Mary F. Radford, By Invitation Only: The Proof of 
Welcomeness in Sexual Harassment Cases, 72 N.C. L. REV. 499, 499 (1994); Oshige, supra note 262, at 
569. For my own criticisms, see Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 
1227, 1249 (1994) (noting the anomaly of making a litigant prove that she did not welcome unlawful 
discrimination); Bernstein, supra note 11, at 502 (arguing that by analogy to the tort affirmative defense 
of volenti—“to the willing, there is no injury”—sexual-harassment defendants ought to have the burden 
of proof on welcomeness). 
 263. In Carr v. Allison Gas Turbine Division, 32 F.3d 1007, 1008–09 (7th Cir. 1994), Judge 
Richard Posner observed that “‘[w]elcome sexual harassment’ is an oxymoron” and held that the 
plaintiff did not have to prove unwelcomeness, Meritor notwithstanding. When courts certify hostile-
environment sexual harassment classes, see Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 387 (N.D. Ill. 
1999); Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 139 F.R.D. 657 (D. Minn. 1991), they in effect remove the 
unwelcomeness criterion from the prima facie case; defendants are forced to litigate the merits even 
though the classes of plaintiffs have not presented evidence that all members found the harassment 
unwelcome. 
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rationales present in rape and domestic violence, respectively, as these legal 
wrongs have been depicted by feminist scholars.  
That said, the unwelcomeness criterion deserves rejection from all judges 
who seek fidelity to the text of a statute, not just feminists. Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. illustrates a non-feminist route 
to de minimis curet lex.264 Now that unwelcomeness has become a sorting 
device for plaintiff’s lawyers and an affirmative defense for employers who 
can show that an employee-plaintiff did not protest the conduct in question, 265 
the criterion has morphed into a demand that plaintiffs must do more than 
other victims of civil rights violations and prove an extra severe injury. Like 
the other judicial devices surveyed here, this expectation adds burdens that 
Congress could have codified in the civil rights statutes but did not. Judges 
attuned to what I have called “the statutory warrant”266 should eschew this 
imposition.  
B.  In Place of De Minimis: Judicial Conclusions Available to 
Exclude Unworthy Cases 
A civil rights claim can fall short, either on its pleadings or after discovery, 
in two ways that pertain to the de minimis curet lex thesis of this Article. First, 
the circumstances or behavior that the plaintiff complains of might not be a 
violation of the statute. Second, regardless of whether the behavior in isolation 
would amount to a violation of the statute, the defendant might not be 
responsible for the detriment that the plaintiff experienced.  
These two accounts implicitly create three conclusions that withhold 
judicial redress for plaintiffs. Qualitative rather than quantitative, these 
conclusions, described below as three “filters,” recognize that de minimis 
curat lex has no principled application to civil rights claims. When any one of 
the conclusions is supported by the pleadings or the record, the defendant 
should prevail as a matter of law. When none of the conclusions is warranted, 
the claim is suited to go to trial. At trial, a defendant may be able to persuade 
the factfinder that the civil rights violation for which it is responsible is too 
trivial to warrant redress.267 
                                                                                                                          
 264. See supra notes 238–44. 
 265. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.  
 266. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 267. Here I express partial agreement with a thesis advanced by a distinguished trial judge and her 
law clerk. Shira A. Scheindlin & John Elofson, Judges, Juries, and Sexual Harassment, 17 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 813 (1999). The authors contend that judges are generally more competent than juries to 
decide whether a work environment is hostile. Id. at 815. They apply this thesis to both sexual and racial 
harassment, id. at 822–24, while conceding that federal judges enjoy privileges that might blinker them 
to workplace detriments. Id. at 833 & n.124 (noting that these judges have “constitutionally-protected 
job security” and as employers “are exempt from Title VII restrictions”). The authors recommend that 
judges “review de novo a jury’s conclusion that a hostile environment pervades a workplace and that 
trial judges should decide summary judgment motions with a critical eye on the quality and quantity of 
the proffered evidence.” Id. at 815. I have no quarrel with substituting judges for juries as fact finders; 
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1.  First Filter: Concluding That No Civil Rights-Violating 
Conditions Were Present  
The most basic way to forestall an unsound claim of discrimination is to 
conclude that the behavior of which the plaintiff complains does not violate 
the plaintiff’s civil rights. This conclusion rests on a judgment about the kind 
of harm that occurred, rather than its degree. It is fundamental. Once a court 
agrees with a plaintiff that a challenged behavior violates a statutory provision 
of civil rights, it has accepted a crucial part of the plaintiff’s account. From 
there, disparaging the injury as too trivial becomes an unprincipled slur with 
no warrant in the statutes. The proper characterization of a claim that deserves 
to fail at the outset is distinct and different: the plaintiff loses because the 
behavior challenged does not violate his civil rights. 
This filter can, and should, function powerfully in a familiar scenario: A 
plaintiff alleges a hostile work environment and the court, though willing to 
acknowledge some unpleasantness there, feels disinclined to deem this 
environment bad enough to violate employment discrimination law.268 Here, 
neither a plaintiff’s recitation of adverse episodes nor a defendant’s insistence 
that the episodes were trivial can resolve the question of whether the 
environment did or did not violate the plaintiff’s civil rights. Clear direction 
from the Supreme Court has told judges to evaluate the work environment 
holistically and inquire whether unlawful discrimination altered it.269 
Whenever a lower court believes a plaintiff has made a federal case, so to 
speak, out of nothing much, rejecting the claim compels the judge to take into 
account the entire workplace described in pleadings or at the trial.  
Assuming that a plaintiff has worked to allege discriminatory conditions 
that amount to an “alter[ed] . . . environment,”270 the judge must unite two 
conflicting accounts: the plaintiff’s roster of unpleasant episodes and the 
defendant’s characterization of the work environment as benign. Calling 
allegations “isolated” or in some other way not bad enough, without aligning 
the account against the work environment as a whole, denies this litigant her 
due. Paying attention to the entire environment uses de minimis considerations 
correctly; it can justify judicial rejection. 
                                                                                                                          
this Article is striving for neutrality with respect to jury-reverence. See supra notes 27, 231–36 and 
accompanying text. Judges do some fact finding tasks better than juries. Scheindlin & Elofson, supra at 
834–38. 
Where I differ with the authors is on the one-sided application of the repair they recommend. If courts 
were open to granting summary judgment for plaintiffs in discrimination cases, then substituting judges 
for juries in the fact finder role would have an evenhanded effect. Summary judgment as now practiced, 
however, functions to protect only one side of the caption. 
268. See related discussion and sources supra note 25. 
 269. For recent applications of this guidance derived from Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 
U.S. 17, 23 (1993), see Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 685 (7th Cir. 2010) (alleging 
disability-based harassment); Saunders v. Emory Healthcare, Inc., No. 09-10283, 2010 WL 65170, at 
*5 (11th Cir. Jan. 11, 2010) (per curiam) (alleging race-based harassment). 
 270. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). 
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For a different application of this first filter―one that undertakes the 
Harris inquiry by emphasizing another distinction, the distinction between 
kind and degree―consider Baskerville v. Culligan International Co., a 
decision by the Seventh Circuit granting judgment to a defendant on a hostile-
environment claim, contrary to a jury verdict that had favored the plaintiff.271 
Commentators have criticized this decision;272 much of their criticism may be 
conceded here for argument’s sake. Whether the Seventh Circuit reached the 
right outcome does not matter, for present purposes: its approach is what 
warrants attention. 
Valerie Baskerville had worked as a secretary at the Culligan bottled water 
company. Her boss, a regional manager, offended her. The plaintiff prevailed 
at trial and then lost on appeal. “Mr. Hall,” wrote Judge Richard Posner, 
“whatever his qualities as a sales manager, is not a man of refinement; but 
neither is he a sexual harasser.”273 After reviewing the plaintiff’s account, 
Posner gave reasons for the court’s conclusion that described the manager’s 
behavior as not violative of the plaintiff’s civil rights: 
He never touched the plaintiff. He did not invite her, explicitly or 
by implication, to have sex with him, or to go out on a date with 
him. He made no threats. He did not expose himself, or show her 
dirty pictures. He never said anything to her that could not be 
repeated on primetime television . . . . Some of his repartée, such 
as, “Not until you stepped your foot in here,” or, “Were we 
dancing, like in a nightclub?,” has the sexual charge of an Abbott 
and Costello movie. The reference to masturbation completes the 
impression of a man whose sense of humor took final shape in 
adolescence. It is no doubt distasteful to a sensitive woman to 
have such a silly man as one’s boss, but only a woman of 
Victorian delicacy―a woman mysteriously aloof from 
contemporary American popular culture in all its sex-saturated 
vulgarity―would find Hall’s patter substantially more 
distressing than the heat and cigarette smoke of which the 
plaintiff does not complain.274 
Here, the Seventh Circuit articulates the difference between a legal wrong 
too trivial to matter, which this Article has contended is a conclusion that civil 
rights statutes give judges no prerogative to conclude, and a set of behaviors 
that was no legal wrong at all. It is the manager’s displays, not the plaintiff’s 
accusations, that receive judicial dismissal and scorn. If the manager had 
violated Baskerville’s civil rights, then Baskerville would have been entitled 
to judgment following her verdict. Instead Judge Posner casts the behavior in 
                                                                                                                          
 271. Baskerville v. Culligan Int’l Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430–31, 433 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 272. Keller & Tracy, supra note 21, at 260. 
 273. Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 431. 
 274. Id.  
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question as not violative of Title VII. 
The court could be wrong; but agree or disagree, its assessment of what 
happened to Valerie Baskerville does not trivialize her complaint. The court 
makes clear its low regard for the Culligan manager: few people are ever 
called something so devastating as “such a silly man” in the Federal Reporter. 
The plaintiff loses not because of an arbitrary de minimis hurdle but because 
the court finds that the behavior she protested was not indicative of a hostile 
environment. Judges are competent to so conclude, even after a jury has held 
otherwise.275 
2.  Second Filter: Concluding That Although Civil Rights-Violating 
Conditions Likely Were Present, Individuals Other than an 
Entity Defendant Were Responsible 
Once the plaintiff has presented behavior that violates his civil rights, the 
defendant may have an affirmative defense related to responsibility for this 
wrong. This second filter, which declares a responsibility boundary, directs 
judges to ask who in effect owns the wrongful conduct. When the defendant is 
an entity, it can escape ownership of the wrong if it acted responsibly at the 
time. 
The leading decision on employer liability for hostile-environment sexual 
harassment, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, establishes the centrality of 
responsibility in civil rights litigation. Faragher rejects liability when 
defendants are not responsible for conduct that would otherwise suffice to 
establish violations. It establishes an affirmative defense for employers 
whereby defendants are not liable for their employees’ rights-violating 
harassment if they can establish the two elements of the defense: they acted 
reasonably to “prevent and correct promptly” any harassing behavior and the 
plaintiff-employee “unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventative 
or corrective opportunities” that the defendant-employer put in place.276  
This two-part test removes responsibility from an employer when the 
record shows that others are responsible for the rights-violating conduct and 
the employer is not. Courts are empowered to ascribe blame for the harm to 
employees who violated the employer’s policy, along with blaming plaintiffs 
who unreasonably failed to take shelter in their employers’ preventatives. The 
affirmative defense classification, supported further by Faragher and the 
companion Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,277 obliges defendants to do 
                                                                                                                          
 275. See Scheindlin & Elofson, supra note 267, at 815. 
 276. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998). A similar approach applies to 
claims of harassment in education, although with more demanding criteria: entity defendants are not 
liable unless plaintiffs can prove actual knowledge of the harassment, deliberate indifference, and both 
severity and pervasiveness. Brianna J. Schroeder, Note, Power Imbalances in College Athletics and an 
Exploited Standard: Is Title IX Dead?, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1483, 1489–98 (2009) (summarizing 
holdings of the Supreme Court).  
 277. 524 U.S. 742, 764–65 (1998). 
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the work whenever plaintiffs are to be blamed. Accordingly, should 
defendants, for example, proffer a harassment policy to show that a plaintiff 
could have fended off adverse disparate treatment before it injured her, they 
must show the reasonableness of this policy. Boilerplate disapproval of 
harassment with an office to hear complaints probably does not suffice: it is 
reasonable for an employee to eschew human-resources protocols at early 
stages in an effort to diffuse tensions on a job, and so the policy must not 
require workers who feel harassed to make a prompt official complaint at pain 
of forfeiting their claim.278  
3.  Third Filter: Concluding that the Plaintiff Bears Responsibility 
for the Conditions Complained Of  
A final route to exoneration is for the court to blame the plaintiff. At 
present, courts do so all the time, but conventions obscure their judgments on 
this point. Claimant-blaming should be transparent and overt. Compelled to 
say, almost in so many words, “You lose because it is you and not the 
defendant who is responsible for whatever civil rights violation may be 
present in the behavior of which you complain,” a court becomes more 
mindful in its assignment of blame.  
Civil rights plaintiffs can be understood as responsible for their own injury 
in two ways. The first way, noted above, is to react unreasonably to rights-
violating affronts.279 The second way is to manifest approval and acceptance 
of the rights-violating behavior when it occurred. Both conclusions raise the 
danger of unjust victim-blaming, but each can be accurate.  
Welcoming the behavior in question, a possibility discussed above,280 is 
only one of the ways that the plaintiff may be deemed responsible for the 
experiences about which he or she complains. The plaintiff might have 
responded unreasonably, making it too difficult for the defendant to effect a 
repair. Familiar affirmative defenses pertaining to delay―statutes of 
limitation and laches―can also ascribe responsibility to a plaintiff. Even the 
controversial criminal law doctrine of “provocation” can defeat accusations.281 
Judges applying these doctrines already know that the doctrines all hold a 
key trait in common: they rarely arise. Most victims of rights-violating 
conduct do not respond unreasonably.282 Stale claims and laches are atypical 
                                                                                                                          
 278. Evan D. H. White, Note, A Hostile Environment: How the “Severe or Pervasive” 
Requirement and the Employer’s Affirmative Defense Trap Sexual Harassment Plaintiffs in a Catch-22, 
47 B.C. L. REV. 853, 855 (2006). 
 279. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 280. See supra Part III.A.5. 
 281. See Paul Nicholas Monnin, Proving Welcomeness: The Admissibility of Evidence of Sexual 
History in Sexual Harassment Claims Under the 1994 Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 412, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 1155, 1166–67 (1995) (arguing that the Henson and Meritor decisions “establish that the 
plaintiff’s invitation to or provocation of the alleged harassment is of central, if not determinative, 
importance to the disposition of her claim”). 
 282. See supra text accompanying note 278 (discussing the insight of commentator Evan D. H. 
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in civil rights litigation too, as is provocation. But all can happen, and they 
should be available to filter unworthy claims from juries as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
Judgments about size, scope, or magnitude―such as “adequate,” “too big,” 
“not enough”―can occur only within contexts that set expectations and 
baselines. If civil rights matter, then a civil rights violation of any size is not 
trivial, just as violations of property rights and constitutional rights of any size 
are not trivial.283 Courts stray from this precept when they refuse to remedy 
infringements of statutory antidiscrimination law on the ground that the 
wrongs are too small to warrant their attention.  
Whenever a federal court declines to repair rights-violative experiences on 
the ground that they are not important enough―using mystifying labels of 
dismissal like “isolated,”284 not sufficiently “hellish,”285 not a steady barrage 
of opprobrium,286 and so on, to describe its conclusions―it obstructs a 
scheme for prevention and redress that Congress installed. This Article has 
described manifest unlawful discrimination as a wrong that, if left 
unaddressed, risks generating more wrongdoing.287 In this sense, civil rights 
violations resemble the disorder that James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling 
sought to undo in their famed 1982 publication, Broken Windows. 
Support for this contention emerges through extensions of a metaphor that 
normally resides in the criminal justice neighborhood. American psychologist 
Gordon Allport’s scale of animus, with hateful words at one end and 
extermination of human beings at the other, resembles in heightened form the 
path of deterioration that Wilson and Kelling described.288 The American 
military uses broken windows reasoning to crack down on relatively small 
demonstrations of extreme racial bigotry, and some scholars have argued that 
it ought to treat relatively small demonstrations of sexism with similar 
intolerance.289 Illustrations related to sex discrimination have included the 
social-meaning category, where a small disorder manifests or begets a larger 
one, and an arithmetical variation on broken windows, where sex 
discrimination at a low level leads to enlarged effects at upper levels of a 
workplace pyramid.290 Reversing the broken windows trajectory, a relatively 
small public display of progress (e.g., a new gay-straight alliance in a school 
or an intervention that makes life in public spaces easier for a person with a 
                                                                                                                          
White). 
 283. See supra text accompanying notes 13–16. 
 284. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 285. Perry v. Harris Chernin, Inc., 126 F.3d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 286. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 287. See supra Part II.A. 
 288. See supra notes 113–16 and accompanying text. 
 289. See supra notes 117–25 and accompanying text. 
 290. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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particular disability) generates relatively large improvements.291 
When courts permit discriminatory behaviors to flourish openly, victims 
and observers will infer that the communities in which they live do not care 
about this suffering,292 and that the legislation proscribing harmful attention to 
group-based characteristics has little force. They can expect the unremedied 
disorder that has injured them to get worse. Victims of civil rights violations, 
along with decent-minded onlookers, desire what Wilson and Kelling’s urban 
residents wanted: “a modicum of civility and safety for ordinary citizens who 
travel daily along streets and by public transportation to work, to school, to 
shop in pursuit of all the ordinary activities of everyday life.”293 Just as having 
to live amidst broken windows blighted the daily lives of Wilson and 
Kelling’s city residents even when they were not direct victims of crime, 
having to live in an environment that condones discrimination blights the 
daily lives of even those persons not directly suffering discrimination 
themselves. 
The stance that I have called De minimis curet lex―the law should concern 
itself with small things when these small things attack important values or 
threaten escalations of the harms that are addressed in civil rights 
statutes―presents a jurisprudential approach that judges and scholars will find 
familiar.294 Broken windows criminology is almost equally venerable.295 Both 
approaches are rooted in deep traditions, a condition that makes progressive 
change more likely to result from their concerted application.296 
Uniting broken windows with civil rights liability brings contemporary 
relevance to both sets of traditions.  Statutory civil rights might seem different 
from the pre-political idyll of law and order on the street that broken windows 
law enforcement has been trying to advance. Decades following the enactment 
of civil rights legislation, however, have made these positive rights 
historically prior to the infractions that now harm victims and civil society. 
Most Americans who are alive today came of age after a civil rights era was 
long established. Their entitlement to be safe from unlawful discrimination 
now stands as solid as an intact window. Manifest and unrepaired civil rights 
                                                                                                                          
 291. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 292. See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text (reviewing the work of Dan Kahan). 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
 294. See supra notes 12–16 and accompanying text (noting that courts do indeed concern 
themselves with small things when they regard the stakes as high). 
 295. Criticisms notwithstanding, see supra Part I.B., it will likely remain venerable; American 
police forces and elected officials in municipalities have long deemed broken windows vital to law 
enforcement. William Bratton & George Kelling, There Are No Cracks in the Broken Windows, NAT’L 
REV. ONLINE, Feb. 28, 2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/bratton_kelling20060228101  
5.asp (maintaining that enthusiasm for broken windows among police officers and local governments 
serves as an unassailable refutation of criticism) (last visited June 17, 2010). 
 296. Cf. Anita Bernstein, How to Make a New Tort: Three Paradoxes, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1539, 
1544–47 (1997) (arguing that a new tort gains acceptance more readily when its proponents can 
associate it with a longstanding doctrinal tradition). 
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violations bespeak—and also cause—a disorder and disarray that American 
courts can repair. 
 
